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IN DEFENSE OF THE 2006 TITLE IX
REGULATIONS FOR SINGLE-SEX
PUBLIC EDUCATION: HOW
SEPARATE CAN BE EQUAL
Abstract: The U.S. Department of Education recently amended the regula-
tions implementing Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, which is
the federal statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. The new
regulations provide greater flexibility for school districts to offer single-sex
public elementary and secondary education. They embrace the recent
growth of single-sex education in the United States, but some question
their constitutionality. This Note explores how the U.S. Supreme Court
should rule on a challenge brought against the regulations under the
Equal Protection Clause. It introduces Title IX, the new regulations, and
the relevant Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, and it presents an ar-
gument for upholding the regulations' constitutionality. The Note then
proceeds by rejecting a previously proposed analogy to the "separate but
equal" doctrine prohibiting segregation on the basis of race in education.
Instead, it favors an analogy to the athletic field, where segregation by sex
has thrived under Title IX, suggesting that the single-sex programs pro-
moted under the new regulations may be able to withstand judicial scrutiny.
INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of true gender equality in public education in the
United States has been, and continues to be, a thorny one. 1 Indeed, in
1973, in Fmntiero v. Richardson, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized,
"[O]tir Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimina-
tion," which has been fueled in part by "discrimination in our educa-
tional institutions."2 During the American colonial period and the years
following the Revolutionary War, schoolhouse doors were commonly
1 See Diane Heckman, Women and Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title 1 -14 9 U.
MIAMI ENT, & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 9 (1992). Throughout this Note, the word "sex" is used to
refer to biological differences between males and females, while the word "gender" is used
to refer to cultural differences between the two. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mis-
take of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1
(1995).
2 See 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973), quoted in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531
(1996).
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closed to girls. 1 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all-
female high schools and colleges began sprouting up to offer an educa-
tion considered appropriate for girls—one far inferior to that available to
boys.4 Also during that time, more schools became coeducationaI. 5
The enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, which
granted full citizenship status to women, and the momentum pro-
duced by the civil rights and feminist movements of the mid-twentieth
century helped turn a spotlight onto the differential treatment of
women in the United States. 6 To reduce the possibility of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in education, almost all public schools in the
second half of the twentieth century were made coeducational.'' In
fact, in 1996, Justice Scalia heralded the death of all single-sex public
educations His pronouncement, however, appears to have been mis-
guided.9 The number of single-sex educational environments has ex-
3 Maryam Ahrahjani, Mary Daly v. Boston College: The Impermissibility of Single-Sex Class-
moms Within a Private University, 9 AM. U. j. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 179, 183 (2001); Jill
Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women's "Full Citizenship*: A Case Study of Sex-
Segregated Public Education, 101 Mica. L. REV. 755, 779-80 (2002).
4 Hasday, supra note 3, at 780-83, 795-801; Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment?
Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender; 2004 Wis. L. REV. 15, 66.
5 See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences
of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 514 (1999).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ('The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."); Tram
Valentin, Title IX A Brief History, 2 HOLY CROSS J.E. & Pus. POL'Y 123, 127 (1997).
7 See Whitney Ransome & Meg Milne Moulton, Why Girls' Schools? The Difference in Girl-
Centered Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. Lj. 589, 589-90 (2001).
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rationale of today's deci-
sion is sweeping .... [1] t ensures that single-sex public education is functionally dead.").
This was a stronger pronouncement than the one made by justice Blackmun in disSent in
1982, in Mississippi University for Women a Hogan:
While the Court purports to write narrowly, declaring that it does not decide
the same issue with respect to "separate but equal' undergraduate institutions
for females and males, or with respect to units of MUW other than its School
of Nursing, there is inevitable spillover from the Court's ruling today. That
ruling, it seems to me, places in constitutional jeopardy any state-supported
educational institution that confines its student body in any area to members
of one sex, even though the State elsewhere provides an equivalent program
to the complaining applicant. The Court's reasoning does not stop with the
School of Nursing of the Mississippi University for Women.
458 U.S. 718, 734 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Patricia
Werner Lamar, Comment, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory Remedies for Sex Segrega-
tion in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 32
EMORY U. 1111, 1140 (1983) (portending the death of single-sex education after Hogan).
9 See Galen Sherwin, Single-Sex Schools and the Antisegregation Principle, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 35, 56 (2005).
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ploded over the past few years."' According to the National Associa-
tion for Single Sex Public Education (the "NASSPE"), in 1995 only
three public elementary and secondary schools offered single-sex
educational opportunities; in the 2005-06 school year at least 262 did
so; as of October 2007, at least 383 did so. 11
The U.S. Department of Education (the "DOE") has embraced
this new trend." It recently amended the regulations implementing
Title IX of the 1972, Education Amendments ("Title IX"), the federal
gender antidiscrimination statute," expanding the public elementary
and secondary schools' ability to provide single-sex educational oppor-
tunities. 14 These new regulations have stirred deep passions, both in
those who favor and oppose them. 15 Some people, such as those at the
NASSPE, heartily endorse this progressive movement, celebrating the
new regulations as an enormously beneficial weapon for achieving
gender equality in the United States." Others, such as the American
Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU") and the National Organization for
Women ("NOW") bemoan that the DOE has taken a significant step
backwards on the road to gender equality, opening the door for the
• 10 Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Schools/Schools With Single-Sex
Classrooms/What's the Difference?, http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
11 id.
12 See 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006).
13 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Title IX is "a strong and compre-
hensive measure . [designed] to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek
education and training for later careers ... [and] to expand some of our basic civil rights
and labor laws to prohibit the discrimination against women which has been so thoroughly
documented." 118 CONG. Rec. 5806-07 (1972) {statement of Sen. Bayh).
14 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2007).
13 See Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Separate but Equal Education in the Context of Gender, 49 N.Y.L.
Sot. L. REV. 785, 785 (2004); Sherwin, supra note 9, at 36.
16 See Letter from Leonard Sax, Executive Dir. of the Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub.
Educ., to Kenneth L. Marcus, Assistant Sec'y for the Dep't of Educ. (Apr. 16, 2004) [here-
inafter Letter from Leonard Sax], available at http://www.singlesexschools.org/OCR.htm.
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resurgence of discrimination." In addition, those who oppose the regu-
lations argue that they should be struck down as unconstitutional.v 3
Litigation on this subject appears to be inevitable. 13 The ACLU, for
example, has indicated that it is "'looking at schools that are segregat-
ing students by sex and considering whether any of them are ripe for a
challenge.'"20 This Note seeks to evaluate how the U.S. Supreme Court
should rule on such a challenge to the constitutionality of single-sex
education and the new Title IX regulations. 21 Part I begins with an
overview of Title IX and the new regulations concerning public ele-
mentary and secondary single-sex education. 22 Next, Part 11 presents a
discussion of how courts have considered single-sex education in the
past, particularly under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 23 It then continues with an argument in favor of uphold-
ing the new regulations as constitutional according to the current
Equal Protection Clause standard, with support from Title IX's legisla-
tive history.24 Part III first rejects the application of the doctrine prohib-
iting "separate but equal" educational opportunities based on race to
the gender context. 25 It then concludes by exploring the constitutional-
' 7 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, New Title IX Regulations Pose a Serious Threat
to Civil Rights of Students (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/edu/
27207res20061026.html [hereinafter ACLU] (quoting Emily Martin, Deputy Director of
the ACLU Women's Rights Project); Nat'l Org. for Women, Comments of the National
Organization for Women on the Department of Education's Notice of Intent to Regulate
on Single-Sex Education (May 2002), http://www.now.org/issues/education/single-sex-
education-cotrunents.html [hereinafter NOW]; see also Chris Moran, Benefits, Drawbacks Seen
in Gender Separate Classes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIG., Dec. 20, 2004, at Al (noting that ACLU
and NOW contributed over 5000 comments to the proposed Title IX regulations to argue
that the regulations were unconstitutional).
la See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, LaShawn Y. Warren, Lenora Lapidus Sc Emily
Martin, Representatives of the Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Kenneth L. Marcus, Assistant
Sec'y for the Dep't of Educ. (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Murphy et al.), avail-
able at http://www.aciu.org/womensrights/edu/13176leg20040423.h tml.
19 See Kimberley J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 Wm. & MARY L. Rev. 1953, 1985 n.168 (2006) ("As the
number of single-sex schools increases, single-sex schools may be more likely to spur litiga-
tion?).
" Diana Jean Schemo, Change in Federal Rules Backs Single-Sex Public Education, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 2006, at Al (quoting Emily Martin, Deputy Director of the Women's Rights
Project at the ACLU).
21 See infra notes 162-324 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 27-105 and accompanying text
23 See infra notes 106-161 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 162-249 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 250-281 and accompanying text.
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ity of sex segregation in the classroom by comparison to sex segregation
on the athletic field.26
I. AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF TITLE IX AND SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
The U.S. Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to its Spending
Clause power" as a progressive measure intended to achieve gender
equality in educational institutions receiving federal funds.28 The stat-
ute speaks in sweeping language that does not specifically address sin-
gle-sex elementary and secondary education; rather, its regulations
have broached this topic. 29
This Part provides a general description of Title IX, where it
comes from, and what it seeks to accomplish." It then details Title IX
regulations, which were'recently amended to encourage the growth of
single-sex education." Lastly, it explains how these amendments de-
veloped in response to research indicating the potential pedagogical
benefits of single-sex education.32
A. Background of Title IX
The origins of Title IX date back to President John F. Kennedy's
1961 Executive Order No. 10,980 establishing the President's Com-
mission on the Status of Women, which revealed distressing levels of
sex discrimination in the United States." Six years later, on October
13, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson amended his Executive Order
No. 11,246 to include the first prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex. 34
Less than three years later, these executive actions garnered con-
gressional support.35 Congressional hearings in 1970 drew attention
28 See info notes 282-324 and accompanying text.
27 See U.S. CONST. art. L § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.").
28 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 & Supp.111 2003).
28 See id. § 1681; 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2007); infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.	 .
33 Exec. Order No. 10,980, 26 Fed. Reg. 12,059 (Dec. 14, 1961).
34 See Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (amending Exec. Order No.
11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965)). This prohibition was added to prohibitions
of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin in the employ-
ment of federal contractors. Id.
" See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
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to rampant sex discrimination in education.56 The response to these
hearings was Title IX, which emerged out of separate bills from both
houses of Congress." The first draft of the statute, proposed by the
House Subcommittee on Higher Education, chaired by Representa-
five Edith Green, surfaced in the House of Representatives in 1970, as
a part of a general education bill." This draft took the form of an
amendment to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"),
proposing that the statute would include sex discrimination among its
prohibitions." Ultimately, this measure did not pass but evolved into a
separate bill, H.R. 7248, which specifically prohibited sex discrirnifia-
tion." This bill passed in the House on November 4, 1971. 41
Meanwhile, in the Senate, Senator Birch Bayh proposed an
amendment to an education bill then on the floor, which sought to
prohibit sex discrimination in educational institutions.42 This version,
which did not pass, provided for a phase-in period during which all
single-sex schools would be required to integrate the excluded sex. 43
In contrast, the next version of the bill, proposed in the following year
also by Senator Bayh, contained an explicit exemption for single-sex
admissions policies to elementary, secondary, and private under-
graduate schools, as well as for religious and military academies. 44 It
eventually passed on March 1, 1972, and was sent to conference with
H.R. 7248. 45 An agreement over the differing provisions of the House
and Senate bills was finally reached, and the resulting bill became law
when President Nixon signed it on June 23, 1972. 46
38 118 CONG. Rm. 5808-09 (1972). Research compiled by the Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee indicated that: women comprised only 29.3% of the entering class for
the most selective schools in the United States; on average, men were awarded more finan-
cial aid; schools paid their female professors substantially less than their male counter-
parts; and other such evidence of discrimination against women. Id.
s 7 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong. (1971); S. 659, 92d Cong. {1971).
38 H.R. 16,098, 91st Cong. § 885 (1970).
" See H.R. 16,098. It appeared along with amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and to the Equal Pay Act. Id.
40 117 CONG. REC. 30,882 (1971); see N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523
n.13 (1982).
41 117 CONG. REC. 30,882, 39,252 (1971); see N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 523
n.13.
42 See 117 CONG. REC. 30,155 (1971).
43 See id. at 30,399 (1971).
44 See 118 CoNo. REc. 5803, 5812-13 (1972).
45 Id.
45 See id. at 22,702. The Senate agreed to the bill, id. at 18,862, as did the House, id. at
20,340. The final bill took the form of a separate title, proposed by Representative Green,
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This law, now known as Title IX, mandates, "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."47 Congress modeled the language of Title IX's antidis-
crimination proclamation to be almost identical to that used in Title
VI.48 It did so in the hopes that Title IX would promote sex equality as
dramatically and effectively as Title VI had promoted racial equality.°
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has consequently interpreted Title
VI and Title IX in pari materia.5° In addition, Congress intended to use
Title VI as a limit on Title IX; Senator Bayh stated:
[W]e really are not doing anything to the private school that
is not now in the law under title VI of the Civil Rights Act, re-
lating to discrimination in other areas. We are saying that the
power which now resides in the Federal Government over pri-
vate institutions shall be extended. We are only adding the 3-
letter word "sex" to existing law. 51
Thus, Title IX was revolutionary for the type of discrimination it
aimed to prevent but not for its approach in accomplishing that aim. 52
so as to honor the requests of Americans who feared that amendments to Tide VI would
weaken it. Valentin, supra note 6, at 125.
47 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). In 1984, the Supreme Court held, in Grove City College v.
Bell, that Tide IX was "program-specific," applying only to those programs actually receiv-
ing federal funds. See 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984). Congress, however, did not agree with
such a narrow reading of Title IX and thus legislatively reversed Grove City College by enact-
ing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which adopted an "institution-wide" approach.
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
48 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi, 441 U.S. 677, 693-96 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("The
drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpieted and applied as Tide VI
had been during the preceding eight years."); 117 CONG. REC. 30,156 (1971) (remarks of
Sen. Bayh); see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
48 See Hafer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 524 F. Supp. 531,
541 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("Title IX was intended to do to sex discrimination what Tide VI was
intended to do to discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin."); see also
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
6° See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 (plurality opinion). Provisions
that are in pari materia are construed together. See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409
U.S. 239, 244 (1972).
61 117 CONG. REC. 30,408 (1971); see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
62 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; 117 CONG. REC. 30,408 (1971).
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In enacting Title IX, Congress took a brazen step in a new direc-
tion because this was the first time that it set out to prohibit sex dis-
crimination in education. 55 Congress had lofty goals, hoping for Title
IX to be an "antidote" against the use of federal funds in support of
discriminatory practices in "all facets of education—admissions, schol-
arship programs, faculty hiring and promotion, profession staffing and
pay scales."54
To accomplish this, Title IX provides both a public remedy and a
private cause of action against such practices. 55 Public enforcement of
the statute occurs through the DOE's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR").
This agency is authorized to terminate federal funding to any non-
complying institution or to pursue "other means authorized by law"
including, but not limited to, proceeding under state or local law and
appealing to the Department of Justice to enforce the regulations. 56
55 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; 117 CONG. REC. 30,155 (1971). Senator Bayh pro-
claimed, "Amendment No. 874 [which included what later became Title IX) is broad, but
basically it closes loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs
.... More specifically, the heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimina-
tion in educational programs receiving Federal funds." 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972). Sena-
tor Bayh likely used the term "amendment" to refer to the whole amendment package,
which expanded the scope of already-existing statutes, whereas he used the term "provi-
sion" to refer to Title IX's antidiscrimination proclamation "because it was something
new." Cheri L. Crow, Note, Does Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Prohibit Employ-
ment Discrimination—An Analysis, 22 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1113 (1981) (citations omitted).
t 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(2000 & Supp. III 2003).
55 20 U.S.C. § 1682; see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (plurality opinion); 118 CONG. REC.
5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Protection under Tide.IX extends to the "direct
beneficiaries of federal financial assistance." Junior Coll. Dist. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp.
1212, 1215 (D. Mo. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir, 1979). This includes students, ap-
plicants, and employees of educational institutions. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at
530; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (plurality opinion); Islesboro Sch. Comm. v. Califano, 593
F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir. 1979). Such plaintiffs may sue any educational program directly
receiving federal funding except for those explicitly exempted by the statute. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a).
56 20 U.S.C. § 1682; 45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2006). Educational institutions not in compliance
with the requirements of Title IX may be reported to the OCR, either through a complaint
or in the course of a compliance review carried out by the OCR. See U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
OCR's Complaint Resolution Procedures, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/com-
plaints-how.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2007). In response, the agency may initiate an ad-
ministrative proceeding. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. The OCR first investigates the complaint of sex
discrimination and attempts to resolve the discrimination by informal means, but, if volun-
tary compliance is unobtainable, the OCR is authorized to revoke funding. Id.; 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.8 (2007). This threat, however, is largely just government scare-tactics used as an
enforcement mechanism. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705 n.38 ("Personally, I think it would be
a rare case when funds would actually be cut off. In most cases alternative remedies, prin-
cipally lawsuits to end discrimination, would be the preferable and more effective remedy."
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In addition, Title IX affords an implied private cause of action—the
Supreme Court established in its 1979 decision in Cannon v. University
of Chicago that, in response to a violation of Title IX, a plaintiff may
sue to recover money damages or to receive injunctive or declaratory
relief. 57 In these ways, Title IX has come to combat discrimination on
the basis of sex. 59
B. The Most Recent Development in Title IX Regulations—Paving the Road
for Single-Sex Public Education
Congress drafted Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in
broad strokes. 59 It, therefore, left much of the interpretation of Title
IX up to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"),
which has since transferred its responsibilities to the DOE's OCR." To
this end, Congress specifically empowered HEW to promulgate regu-
lations implementing Title IX's requirements. 61 HEW, in turn, issued
regulations that endow the statute with a substantial reach and endow
the agency with substantial power to enforce it. 62 HEW's regulations
were first published in June 1974, and were then submitted to the
(quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff))); N. Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S. 512; see also Heckman,
supra note 1, at 25. Actual termination of funds would be a highly severe and inappropri-
ate remedy because it would likely cripple the program and, thus, benefit neither students
nor employees. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704-05.
57 See 441 U.S. at 709 ("Not only the words and history of Tide IX, but also its subject
matter and underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of pri-
vate victims of discrimination."); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 76 (1992) (awarding damages under Title IX to a plaintiff who had suffered from sex-
ual harassment and finding that Congress did not expressly limit the remedies available
under Tide IX); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (granting de-
claratory and injunctive relief). For more discussion of remedies available under Title IX,
see Farah S. Ahmed, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 361,
370-73 (2004).
5e See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
59 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
69 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993). HEW was abolished in
1979, at which point the DOE assumed responsibility for Title IX enforcement. Id.; see The
Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a) (3) (2000).
91 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000). On May 4, 1980, this power was transferred to the DOE. See
20 U.S.C. § 3441 (2000). For this reason, the HEW regulations effectuating Title IX, 45
C.F.R. § 86.1—.71 (1979), were reissued without change on May 4, 1980, in 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.1—.71 (1980). See 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802 (May 9, 1980).
0 See Robert R. Hunt, Implementation and Modification of Title IX Standards: The Evolution
of Athletics Policy, 1999 BYU EDuc. & I, J. 51, 61. .
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Senate and House for review. 63 They entered into force, with no con-
gressional opposition, when President Ford signed them on May 27,
1975 . 64
Approximately twenty-seven years later, on May 8, 2002, the DOE
published a Notice of Intent to Regulate ("NOIR") indicating that the
Secretary planned to amend Title IX regulations.65 Under the regula-
tions in force at that time, single-sex classes were prohibited except in
limited circumstances including: (1) physical education based on ob-
jective standards of physical ability, (2) contact sports, (3) classes ,deal-
ing exclusively with human sexuality, and (4) choruses based on vocal
range or quality. 66 Vocational schools could never be single-sex, and
nonvocational schools could only be single-sex when there was a com-
parable single-sex school for students of the excluded sex. 67 The Secre-
tary thought amendments were necessary to provide more "flexibility"
to educational institutions in establishing single-sex schools and pro-
grams at the elementary and secondary school level."
65 40 Fed. Reg. 24,127 ( June 4, 1975). The regulations were submitted to Congress on
June 3, 1975. 121 CONG. Rm. 16,294, 17,301 (1975). Congressional review was mandated
by statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1) (2000) (made applicable to Title IX by 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232(f) (2000)). The regulations were to take effect forty-five days after their submission
unless Congress, by concurrent resolution, found them to be inconsistent with the author-
izing act and disapproved them. See id. During this time period, HEW received an un-
precedented 9700 comments, which were carefully considered and resulted in significant
differences between the proposed and fmal regulations. See 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 ( June 20,
1974).
64 Valentin, supra note 6, at 126. OCR has also provided further guidance on Title IX's
requirements in the form of a "Policy Interpretation." See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11,
1979). Among other clarifications, the Policy Interpretation established a three-prong test
for compliance in meeting the interests and abilities of male and female student-athletes.
See id.
55 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102-03 (May 8, 2002).
55 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b), (c), (e), (f) (2007).
57 Id. § 106.35. The regulation states:
A recipient which is a local educational agency shall , not, on the basis of sex,
exclude any person from admission to: (a) Any institution of vocational edu-
cation operated by such recipient; or (b) Any other school or educational
unit operated by such recipient, unless such recipient otherwise makes avail-
able to such person, pursuant to the same policies and criteria of admission,
courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and facility
offered in or through such schools.
Id.
66 Id. The NOIR was published simultaneously with "Guidelines on current Tide IX
requirements related to single-sex classes and schools," which was required under the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5131(c), 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codifying and amending Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-
7941 (West 2003 Sc Supp. 2007)), signed into law by President Bush on January 8, 2001. Id.
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Following its NOIR, on March 9, 2004, the DOE published a No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, which set out the proposed amendments
to Title IX regulations. 69 It described how in 1975 gender discrimina-
tion was "widespread," so at that time limiting single-sex conditions as
much as possible was used to limit opportunities for discriminatory
practices as much as possible." In contrast, the DOE determined that
"schools are now far more equitable in their treatment of female stu-
dents."73 Moreover, the DOE cited educational research conducted
over the past thirty years suggesting that single-sex education may pro-
vide educational benefits for some students. 72 Thus, Title IX needed
amending to reflect the "dramatically" changed face of the American
educational landscape."
In response to the proposed amendments to Title IX regulations,
the DOE received approximately 5860 comments, and on October 25,
2006, it published the final version of the new regulations, effective No-
vember 24, 2006. 74 These new regulations make it easier for federal
funding recipients to operate public elementary and secondary schools
that exclude admission to any student on the basis of sex." Nonvoca-
tional schools may be single-sex so long as there is also a "substantially
equal"76 single-sex school for students of the excluded sex or a coeduca-
tional school—whereas previously only a single-sex school for students of
the excluded sex had sufficed. 77 Nonvocational charter schools may be
An amendment to the No Child Left Behind Act proposed by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchi-
son specifically provides that public schools may use federal funds for single-sex programs.
146 CONG. Rec. S5942 (daily ed. June 28, 2000). It received unanimous approval in the
Senate. Press Release, Senate Passes Education Bill, Senator Hutchison's Single-Sex Educa-
tion Amendment Included ( June 14, 2001) (on file with the Boston College Law Review),
available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/bclawreview/Past_Issues.html . Con-
gress allocated more than $400 million to support such programs. Susan G. Clark, Public
Single-Sex Schools: Are They Lawful?, 213 EDUC. L. REP. 319, 319 (2006).
65 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (Mar. 9, 2004).
7° See id.
74 See id.
72 See id. (citing studies).
73 See id.
74 See 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530-32 (Oct. 25, 2006). None claimed that the new regulations
were in and of themselves wrong, but rather the commentators focused on questioning
how the regulations were to be implemented. See Valerie Strauss, Schools May Offer More
Single-Sex Classes Under New-U.S. Regulations, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2006, at A4 (quoting
Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in the DOE).
75 See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2007); infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
76 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c) (3). OCR defines this term using the same factors as for single-
sex programs and activities. See id. § 106.34(b) (3); infra note 84.
77 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c) (1) (emphasis added); id. § 106.35; supra note 67 and accom-
panying text.
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single-sex unconditionally, 78 but public vocational schools are still pro-
hibited entirely from being single-sex. 79
Furthermore, in addition to the four previously established excep-
tions,8° the new regulations include a more general exception allowing
nonvocational coeducational elementary and secondary schools to
provide certain single-sex classes or extracurricular activities. 81 Classes
or activities may be single-sex when they are completely voluntary, im-
plemented in an evenhanded manner, 82 and substantially related either
to improving students' educational achievement through diversity in
educational opportunities or to meeting students' particular identified
educational needs, 83 so long as a substantially equal coeducational class
is also available.84 Thus, under the new Title IX regulations, there is
greater opportunity for single-sex education to exist.°
C. The Impetus Behind the New Title IX Regulations: Scientific Justifications
for Single-Sex Education
The new Title IX regulations arose in response to research suggest-
ing that there are hard-wired differences in learning between the sexes
and, therefore, that separating girls and boys in school permits gender-
tailored education more conducive to learning than coeducation. 86
55 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c) (2).
79 Id. § 106.35.
B0 See id. § 106.34(a); supra note 66 and accompanying text.
51 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) (1) (i)—(iv). These programs and activities do not include
interscholastic, club, or intramural athletics. Id. § 106.34(b) (5) (noting that these are sub-
ject to the provisions of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 and § 106.37(c)).
82 Id. § 106.34 (b) (2). This may require the recipient "to provide a substantially equal
single-sex class or extracurricular activity for students of the excluded sex." Id.
55 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(iii).
54 Id. § 106.34(b)(1) (iv) rFhe recipient [must] provide[] to all other students, includ-
ing students of the excluded sex, a substantially equal coeducational class or extracurricu-
lar activity in the same subject or activity."). The DOE provides six factors for consideration
in determining whether a class or extracurricular activity is substantially equal:
the policies and criteria of admission, the educational benefits provided, in-
cluding the quality, range, and content of curriculum and other services and
the quality and availability of books, instructional materials, and technology,
the qualifications of faculty and staff, geographic accessibility, the quality, ac-
cessibility, and availability of facilities and resources provided to the class, and
intangible features, such as reputation of faculty.
Id. § 106.34(6) (3). These factors may be considered individually or in the aggregate, and
other factors may be considered as well. Id.
55 See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text
55 See Laura Fortney, Public Single-Sex Elementary Schools: "Separate but Equal" in Gender
Filly Years Following Brown v. Board of Education, 35 U. Tot.. L. REV. 857, 873-77 (2004)
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Evidence indicates that the brains of boys are physically different from
those of girls—prenatal testosterone seems to change the brain tissue
of boys permanently, 87 and male brain tissue and structure is, in fact,
different from female brain tissue and structure.88 Additionally, girls'
brains develop differently than those of hoys, 89 and girls and boys use
different parts of their brains to perform the same tasks. 90
Other research suggests that boys and girls learn differently. 91 This
is due in part to the fact that girls tend to have higher standards for
themselves in the classroom and are more likely to evaluate their aca-
demic performance excessively critically, whereas boys tend to overes-
timate their academic performance unrealistically. 92 Moreover, girls are
generally much more concerned with pleasing adults such as teachers
and parents than are boys. 93
More general studies have demonstrated that all students, regard-
less of their sex, may perform better in single-sex educational environ-
ments than in coeducational ones." For example, having students of
only one sex in a classroom eliminates the distraction that students of
the other sex pose.95 In addition, research indicates that girls partici-
pate less and receive less attention and encouragement from teachers
(citing studies); Michael J. Kaufman, Beyond Presumptions and Peafowl: Reconciling the Legal
Principles of Equality with the Pedagogical Benefits of Gender Differentiation, 53 BUFF. L. REV.
1059, 1079-96 (2005); Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub. Educ., Brain Differences (2006),
http://www.singlesexschools.org/research-brain.htrn [hereinafter Brain Differences].
87 Brain Differences, supra note 86 (citing studies).
88 Kaufman, supra note 86, at 1081-83; Brain Differences, supra note 86 (citing studies).
69 Kaufman, supra note 86, at 1080-81; Brain Differences, supra note 86 (citing studies).
99 Kaufman, supra note 86, at 1086-88; Brain Differences, 5t117113 note 86 (citing studies).
81 See Kaufman, supra note 86, at 1090-96; Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub. Educ., Learn-
ing Style Differences (2006), http://www.singlesexschools.org/research •learning.htm [here-
inafter Learning Style Differences].
92 Learning Style Differences, supra note 91 (citing studies).
9$ Id. (citing studies).
s4 See Kay Bailey Hutchison, The Lesson of Single-Sex Public Education: Both Successful and
Constitutional 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2001) (citing , reports); Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50
DUKE L.J. 753, 803-06 (2000); Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single Sex Education, 18
HARV. J.L. & Puts. POL'Y 227, 242-43 (1994); Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis
After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 381, 390-95; Ransome & Moulton, supra note 7, at 596-99; Nat'l Ass'n
for Single Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex v. Coed: The Evidence, http://www.singlesexschools.
org/research-singlesexvscoed.htm (last visited Oct 25, 2007) [hereinafter Single-Sex v. Coed:
The Evidence].
9$ See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HERS-96.122, PUBLIC EDUCATION: ISSUES
INVOLVING SINGLE-GENDER SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS 4 (1996).
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in coeducational settings. 96 In such settings, girls are also more likely to
hide their intelligence, lack self-confidence, and shy away from "male"
subjects like math and science.97 Coeducation also seems to be failing
boys, especially in areas such as reading and writing, where studies show
that girls tend to outperform them."
Proponents of single-sex education look to the above data for sup-
port.99 Indeed, some believe that, assuming girls and boys do in fact
differ in how their brains function and how they learn, gender equality
can only be achieved if girls and boys are taught in different settings.'°°
As the DOE itself recognizes, however, educators cannot all agree
on the effectiveness of single-sex education. 191 The validity of the re-
search in this area is vulnerable to attack because there may actually
be numerous non-sex-based factors at work, such as classroom activi-
ties, teacher qualification, class size, and amount of funding. 102 Al-
though substantial support for single-sex education does exist, there is
no commonly accepted notion today that single-sex education is supe-
rior to coeducation.'" Further research is required,'" and as of yet
96 MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADRER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
CHEAT GIRLS 1 (1994); Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, Of Two Minds: Single-Sex Educa-
tion, Coeducation, and the Search for Gender Equity in K.12 Public Schooling, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
Hum. Wrs. 289, 302-03 (1997) (citing studies).
97 See]olee Land, Not Dead Yet: The Future of Single-Sex Education After United States v.
Virginia, 27 STETSON L. REV. 297, 313-14 (1997) (citing studies); Valorie K. Vojdik, Girls'
Schools After MI: Do They Make the Grade!, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & Pot's' 69, 86 (1997).
99 Seefenkins, supra note 19, at 1965-69; Levit, supra note 5, at 471 (citing studies).
99 See Letter from Leonard Sax, supra note 16.
1 " See Michael]. Kaufman, Rhetorical Questions Concerning Justice and Equality in Educa-
tional Opportunities, 36 Loy. U. Cm. Lj. 495, 509 (2005).
101 71 Fed. Reg. 62,532 (Oct. 25, 2006) (admitting that 'there is a debate among edu-
cators on the effectiveness of single-sex education").
192 Seejenkins, supra note 19, at 1985 ("Single-sex schools may be beneficial or harmful
to students, depending on how they are operated."); Levit, supra note 5, at 502-53; Martha
Minow, Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (and Single-Sex Education): In Honor of
Linda McClain, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 827 (2005); Gary Simson, Separate but Equal and
Single-Sex Schools, 90 CORNELL, L. REv. 443, 452-53 (2005); Letter from Murphy et al., supra
note 18; NOW, supra note 17 ("Studies reveal that, once researchers control for back-
ground factors such as intelligence, socioeconomic status, motivation, and prior achieve-
ment, there are no statistically significant differences between all-female and coeduca-
tional schools.").
los See Brian Johnson, Admitting That Women's Ori61 Public Education Is Unconstitutional and
Advancing the Equality of the Sexes, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 75-85 (2002); Levit, supra now
5, at 503; Simson, supra note 102, at 451-53; Vojdik, supra note 97, at 93; Maggie Ford, Gender-
Bias Study Does Not Advocate Single-Sem Education, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at Alb (describ-
ing that a report prepared in 1998 by the American Association of University Women con-
cluded that "single-sex education is not the solution to gender inequity in school").
104 Keri McWilliams, Education Law Chapter: Single-Sex Education, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
919, 932-33 (2006); Miaow, supra note 102, at 822; Pinzler, supra note 15, at 805 ("I chal-
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the Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to weigh in on the
debate over the pedagogical benefits of single-sex education.ms
II. THE FUTURE OF TITLE IX'S REGULATIONS CONCERNING
SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
Prior to the enactment of Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provided the only shield against any dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. 106 Even now, after the passage of Title
IX and its new regulations, the Equal Protection Clause remains a po-
tential obstacle to any sex segregation in public elementary and secon-
dary education.'"
Because the scope of Title IX is not necessarily coextensive with
that of the Equal Protection Clause, its new regulations do not neces-
sarily pass constitutional muster. 1 °8 But neither do they necessarily run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, and the U.S. Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the constitutionality of public single-sex elementary and
lenge the Department of Education ... to fund a 'gold standard' experiment on the rela-
tive advantages of single-sex education.").
105 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996) (noting that the United
States did not challenge Virginia's assertion that single-sex education benefits at least some
students).
106
	 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within
[the] jurisdiction [of the United States] the equal protection of the laws."). For a discus-
sion of cases relevant to the constitutionality of single-sex education, see Lamar, supra note
8, at 1119-42. The Fourteenth Amendment originally applied only to race-based classifica-
tions, as it was meant to end discrimination against former slaves, but in the 1971 decision
of Reed v. Reed, more than 100 years after its passage, the Supreme Court extended its
scope to gender-based classifications. 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (striking down a statute giving
preference to males over females in petitioning to become an administrator of an estate).
107 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. This issue only arises in public institutions, as
private institutions are, in general, not subject to constitutional limitations. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000) (providing a remedy for violations of constitutional rights that applies only
against persons "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)
("[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States."). For more discussion see Lamar, supra note 8, at
1160-62. Receipt of federal funds does not convert an otherwise private actor into a state




71 Fed. Reg. 62,533 (Oct. 25, 2006). The DOE itself provides a disclaimer along
with the new regulations: "If possible, the regulatory provisions of Title IX are informed by
constitutional principles, but because the scope of the Title IX statute differs from the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause, these regulations do not regulate or implement
constitutional requirements or constitute advice about the U.S. Constitution." Id. (citations
omitted).
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secondary education. 109 The regulations must meet the intermediate
scrutiny standard set out in the 1996 Supreme Court case, United Slates
v. Virginia.'" Although the Court ruled against single-sex education in
that particular instance, it in no way obviously precluded the constitu-
tionality of all single-sex education." In fact, the Court provided many
reasons to uphold such education.'"
This Part examines the standard that applies to the new regula-
tions allowing single-sex education.'" Next, it considers how a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the regulations under that standard
would play out, and it presents an argument differentiating the educa-
tion permitted under the new Title IX regulations from that which the
Court has previously deemed unconstitutional. 114 The Part then con-
chides with a look at the ways in which the legislative and post-enact-
ment history of Title IX further recommend against striking down the
new regulations.'"
A. The Treatment of Single-Sex Education by Courts Under the Equal
Protection. Clause to Date
According to Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the new
regulations would be subject to intermediate scrutiny. 116 This standard,
as first set out by the Supreme Court in 1976, in Craig v. Boren, requires
that any gender classification serve important governmental objectives
and be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives in
order to be constitutional." 7 Indeed, under this standard, the Court
will usually strike down sex-based classifications when the government
could achieve its objective through classifications that are sex-neutrallla
109
	 infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
110 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 & Supp. HI 2003); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996); infra notes 117, 153-156 and accompanying text.
111 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534; infra notes 162-218 and accompanying text.
"2 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524; Land, supra note 97, at 323 ("In light of the [Virginia]
decision and application of the intermediate scrutiny test, the constitutional validity of
'separate but equal' single-sex schools is a distinct possibility."); info notes 162-218 and
accompanying text.
lis See infra notes 116-161 and accompanying text.
114 See infra notes 162-218 and accompanying text.
"5 See infra notes 219-249 and accompanying text.
"6 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (striking down a state statute prohibiting
the sale of 3.2% beer to males under age twenty-one and to females under age eighteen).
I" Id.
116 See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980) (striking down a
state statute favoring males over females in the distribution of workers' compensation
benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 286, 281-83 (1979) (striking down a state statute requiring
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or when classifications are based on "'archaic and overbroad generali-
zations'" related to sex. 119 Intermediate scrutiny is a more exacting stan-
dard than rational basis review but more lenient than strict scrutiny,
which are the other two methods that the Court uses to evaluate gov-
ernment action under the Equal Protection Clause.'"
The Supreme Court has never applied intermediate scrutiny to
elementary and secondary education, 121 though it attempted to do so
in 1977, in Vorchheimer v. School District. 122 There, Philadelphia main-
tained an all-boys school and a separate all-female equivalent, in addi-
tion to multiple coed schools; a female plaintiff filed suit against the
School District of Philadelphia after being denied admission to the
boys' school.'" The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania found in favor of the plaintiff under the Equal Protection
Clause,124 but the U.S Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
because it determined that the school district's important objective of
providing quality education is substantially related to the theory that
students perform better in single-sex settings. 125 The court, therefore,
refused to prohibit the use of what it deemed "a respected educational
males, but not females, to pay alimony upon divorce); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
216-17 (1977) (striking down a federal statute favoring widows over widowers in the distri-
bution of Social Security benefits).
"9 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 740 (1982) (quoting Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (holding that widows and widowers are
equally entitled to Social Security benefits); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85
(1973); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex relT.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.l 1 (1994).
120 Hasday, supra note 3, at 759-60; Jenkins, supra note 19, at 1985-86. Under the re-
quirements of rational basis review, which applies to all classifications not based on race,
national origin, or gender, a classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, and the challenged practice is usually upheld. See Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297,
306 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 '(1955). Under the requirements of strict scrutiny, which is reserved
for race and national origin, a classification must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compel-
ling governmental interest, and the challenged practice is usually struck down. See Clark V.
Deter, 486 U.S. 465, 461 (1988); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 299
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944).
121 See 71 Fed. Reg. 62,533 n.13 (Oct. 25, 2006); Fortney, supra note 86, at 863-64.
122 See generally 430 U.S. 703 (1977); affg by an equally divided Court 532 F.2d 880 (3d
Cir. 1976). justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision. Id.
129 Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 881.
1 24 Id. at 882 ("The trial judge found the gender based classification of students at the
two schools to lack a 'fair and substantial relationship to the School Board's legitimate
interest' and enjoined the practice.").
122 Id. at 888.
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methodology." 126 On appeal, the Supreme Court remained evenly di-
vided and thus merely affirmed the Court of Appeals decision without
issuing an opinion.'"
By contrast, the Supreme Court has successfully reviewed single-
sex education at the postsecondary school level on two occasions. 128 In
1982, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court held that
denying admission to males to the nursing program at Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women ("MUW") violated the Equal Protection Clause.' A
male, who was a qualified applicant to the program except by virtue of
his sex, brought suit when he was not admitted to MUW.'" The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi entered summary
judgment in favor of MUW, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed on the ground that the lower court had improperly
applied a rational basis standard instead of intermediate scrutiny. 151
Upon grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision by a five to four majority.'"
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, explained that a classifi-
cation on the basis of sex would be upheld only upon a showing of "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification."'" A plaintiff needed to present evi-
dence that "the classification serves important governmental objectives
and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.'" 184 The Court strongly pro-
scribed the use of classifications stemming from "fixed notions con-
cerning the roles and abilities of males and females" and "archaic and
stereotypic notions." 135
The Court disapproved of MUW's female-only admissions policy
because rather than creating opportunities previously denied to women,
it instead tended to perpetuate the stereotype that nursing is a female
profession.' 36 The policy failed to pass constitutional muster because it
was not substantially related to benefiting women.'" The Court rea-
126 Id.
127
 Vorrhheimer, 430 U.S. at 703.
128 See generally Virginia, 518 U.S. 515; Hogan, 458 U.S. 718.
1" See458 U.S. at 731.
1" Id. at 720-21.
131 Id. at 721.
132 Id. at 723.
133 Id. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 950 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)); see also Pers.
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
134 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150).
1" Id. at 725.
1" Id. at 729.
137 See id. at 730-31,
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soned that MUW already allowed men to audit its classes as full class-
room participants without encountering any adverse effect on the
women's experience, so nothing justified denying males official MUW
student status.'" The Court, however, did recognize that sex-based clas-
sifications may be justified in other circumstances where they "inten-
tionally and directly" assist members of the disproportionately bur-
dened sex.139
Fourteen years after Hogan, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Virginia struck down the male-only admissions policy espoused by the
state-run Virginia Military Institute {"VMI") . 140 Upon the complaint,
filed with the Attorney General, of a female high-school student seek-
ing to attend VMI, the United States sued Virginia for an alleged Equal
Protection Clause violation.'" Although Virginia prevailed before the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to accept Virginia's reasoning
that it maintained VMI as a single-sex institution to provide a diversity
of educational opportunities—both coeducational and single-sex—to
its citizens. 142
Therefore, at the court's suggestion, the Commonwealth designed
a parallel all-female institution to be the sister school of VMI. 143 The
proposed school, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"),
was intended to train "citizen-soldiers" as did VMI, but it was to func-
tion under very different conditions than those at VMI. 144
 Rather than
offering the rigorous military training found at VMI, VWIL planned to
adopt a more "cooperative method" of education. 145
The Commonwealth returned to court for approval of its plans,
justifying the dissimilarity between VMI and VWIL on pedagogical dif-
ferences between men and women "'in learning and developmental
needs'" and "'psychological and sociological differences.'"146 This satis-
fied the district court, whose decision a divided Court of Appeals af-
138 See id.
Is* See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
140 See 518 U.S. at 534.
141 Id. at 523.
142 See id. at 523-25.
143 Id. at 526. The court had suggested that the Commonwealth either admit women to
VIC, establish a parallel institution for women, or forego public funding for VML Id. at
525-26.
144 See id. at 548.
143 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548.
146 Id. at 549 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 28, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-
1941, 94-2107)).
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firmed)47
 The Supreme Court, however, was not satisfied that the two
programs were "substantially equa[1]." 148
 Therefore, by a seven to one
majority)49
 the Court held that the Commonwealth violated the Equal
Protection Clause by offering the unique educational opportunities
available at VMI only to men and not to women)" Moreover, the sepa-
rate but unequal arrangement with VVVIL did not remedy this viola-
tion)" In so holding, the Court reiterated its commitment to protect-
ing women's "full citizenship stature" by striking down those policies
that deny equal opportunity to women simply on account of their
sex.'" The Court also reaffirmed the standard set out in Hogan, calling
it "skeptical scrutiny."153
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority; specifically noted that
men and women have inherent differences, however, and thus are not
"'fungible.'" 154
 She clarified that sex classifications will be upheld if they
are designed to "compensate women 'for particular economic disabili-
ties [they have] suffered,' to 'promot[e] equal employment opportu-
nity,' [and] to advance full development of the talent and capacities of
our Nation's people," but not if they are designed to "create or per-
petuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women." 155 She
also added a further qualification that governmental objectives "must
be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litiga-
tion."156
The Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that VMI
could not admit women because, if it did, it would have to change its
curriculum to accommodate the physical capacities of women, which
are on average lesser than those of men, and thus would have to
147
 Id. at 527-28.
148 Id. at 554. It noted that the programs differed in the average SAT score of the stu-
dent body, the number of faculty members holding doctoral degrees, faculty salary, range
of curricular offerings, athletic facilities, endowment size, prestige, and alumni network.
Id. at 551-52.
149 See id. at 518. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer
composed the majority, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist concurring; Justice Scalia dis-
sented; justice Thomas recused himself because his son attended VMI at the time the mat-
ter was being argued. Id.
150
	 518 U.S. at 518.
151 Id. at 534.
152See id. at 532.
153 See id. at 531, 533 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724); supra notes 133-134 and accom-
panying text.
154 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 533 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193
(1946)).
155 Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted).
156 Id.
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eliminate the unique opportunities VMI was touted to offer. 157
 The
Court condemned this for being a "notably circular argument" and
pronounced that single-sex education may only be used as a means,
not an end, in sex classifications. 158 The Court focused on the fact that
there were some women "who have the will and capacity" to meet the
challenging demands of VMI. 159
Thus, Virginia and Hogan, both of which concern public postsec-
ondary education, inform our understanding of how the Supreme
Court might handle a challenge to single-sex education in public ele-
mentary and secondary schools, but they do not definitively answer this
question. 160 In both cases the Court explicitly reserved judgment on the
constitutionality of "separate but equal" single-sex public education in
general, and neither case specifically addresses the elementary and
secondary school leve1. 161
B. The Constitutionality of Title IX's Regulations Under Virginia
The fate of Title IX's new regulations in the courts, although un-
certain as of yet, does not necessarily seem destined to be a gloomy
one. 162 The unclear standard set forth in Virginia, which incorporates
that in Hogan, leaves much room for argumentation. 163 justice Scalia
157 See id. at 545.
158 Id.
159 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
160 See id. at 532; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720.
181 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.l. In Virginia, no "separate
but equal" issue arose because VMI was at that time the only single-sex school in the state
and because VMI and VWIL were unequal. 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 ("We address specifically
and only an educational opportunity recognized by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals as 'unique,' an opportunity available only at Virginia's premier military institute,
the Commonwealth's sole single-sex public university or college.") (citations omitted). In
Hogan, the Court specifically noted that, because at that time Mississippi did not maintain
any other single-sex public university, no "separate but equal" issue was raised. 458 U.S. at
720 n.1 ("Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or college. Thus, we
are not faced with the question of whether States can provide 'separate but equal' under-
graduate institutions for males and females.").
182 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2007); William Henry Hurd, Gone with the Wind? VMIs Loss
and the Future of Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 27, 44 (1997)
("[T]he majority [in Virginia] went out of its way to emphasize that its decision turned on
the unique nature of VMI, and that no per se condemnation of single-sex public education
was implied."); Land, supra note 97, at 323 ("[T]he constitutional validity of 'separate but
equal' single-sex schools is a distinct possibility."); Morgan, supra note 94, at 384-85; Amy
H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for Women's Schools, 21 HARV.
WOMEN'S U. 19, 22 (1998).
I" See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Virginia P. Croudace & Steven
A. Desmarais, Where the Boys Are: Can Separate Be Equal in School Sports?, 58 S. CAL. L. Ray.
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commented at the inception of intermediate scrutiny that the stan-
dard is "so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial pref-
erences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation."'" It
has grown only more ambiguous over the years—indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist complained that Virginia introduced even more confound-
ing uncertainty. 165
Justice Ginsburg's intent in renaming the standard in Virginia
"skeptical scrutiny," rather than the previous "intermediate scrutiny,"
is also unclear. 166 Some have argued that Justice Ginsburg actually
heightened the intermediate scrutiny standard, 167 though others dis-
1425, 1435-36 (1985) ("Application of [the intermediate scrutiny] standard leaves consid-
erable room for judicial discretion, because what constitutes a close fit between the statu-
tory classification and the objective sought cannot be defined with any degree of preci-
sion."); Hasday, supra note 3, at 773 ("[T]he Court [in Virginia] does not begin to tell us
how we might take seriously the suggestions [cOncerning heightened scrutiny] that Vir-
ginia put forth."); Jenkins, supra note 19, at 1987 (noting that the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the requirements of intermediate scrutiny inconsistently).
181
	
429 U.S. at 221 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
0=6 See id. at 531 (majority opinion), Compare Lee Schottenfeld, The Fate of Separate but
Equal in the Athletic Arena, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 649, 682 (2002) ("justice Ginsberg
[sic] intentionally refers to an upgraded intermediate scrutiny, which requires the propo-
nent of the discriminatory action to provide a heightened level of justification."), with
Hurd, supra note 162, at 49 (concluding that the Court in Virginia did not "ratchet up the
level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications"), and Rainey, supra note 86, at 862 (arguing
that "it is more likely that Justice Ginsburg was simply using alternative language to rear-
ticulate the Court's use of intermediate scrutiny").
167 See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that 'the ration-
ale of today's decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of interme-
diate scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny" because the majority
applied a "least-restrictive-means analysis" by finding VMI unconstitutional when only some
women could go there); Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 Am. U.J. GEN-
DER & L. 35, 36 (1997) ("While the Court stopped short of explicitly adopting strict scru-
tiny for sex-based classifications, the opinion includes a number of indicators suggesting
that the standard applied in [Virginia] is essentially as rigorous as today's strict scrutiny
standard."); Jamal Greene, Hands Off Policy: Equal Protection and the Contact Sports Exemption
of Title DC 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 133, 144 (2005) ("[T]he [Virginia] test makes clear
that no deference is due whatsoever. The state unquestionably bears a heavy burden.")
(citation omitted); Christopher H. Pyle, Women's Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex Still justifiable
After United States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REV. 209, 233 (1997) ("Justice Ginsburg's opin-
ion came as close to strict scrutiny as possible without actually embracing it."); Kevin N.
Rolando, A Decade Later United States v. Virginia and the Rise and Fall of "Skeptical Scrutiny,"
12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 182, 209-10 (2006) ('This holding makes clear that the
Court's standard of 'skeptical scrutiny' was concerned with the individual. This is
where the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' language heightens the standard."); Cass
R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Ter ►—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L.
REV. 4, 75 (1996) ('The Court [in Virginia] did not merely restate the intermediate scru-
tiny test but pressed it closer to strict scrutiny.").
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agree. 168 But regardless, what does remain clear is that there are de-
cidedly some circumstances in which sex segregation is acceptable
because the Supreme Court does not categorically prohibit it and,
moreover, specifically chooses not to apply strict scrutiny to it. 169 Jus-
tice Ginsburg herself has stated that her opinion in Virginia never
questioned "the value or viability of single-sex schools."'" Indeed, the
strict holding of Virginia is that neither generalizations about women
nor references to psychological and sociological differences between
the sexes may be used to justify the inequality of the single-sex pro-
grams.'" This holding is not immediately transferable to single-sex
programs, which, by the express terms of the Title IX regulations
themselves, must be equal.'" The Court's determination that VMI's
admissions policy was unconstitutional does not automatically signal
the unconstitutionality of single-sex public elementary and secondary
education.'"
168 See Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (citation
omitted) (purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny as set out in Virginia but in fact up-
holding a law requiring different action for an alien to obtain citizenship depending on
whether the applicant's mother or father was a U.S. citizen, without calling it "skeptical
scrutiny," without requiring "exceedingly persuasive justification," and without focusing on
the individual); Morgan, supra note 94, at 383, 414 (arguing that the majority in Virginia
did not raise the level of scrutiny for gender classifications above intermediate scrutiny);
Sharon E. Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 43,
44-45 (1997) (same); Tod Christopher Gurney, Comment, 38 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 1183,
1205-10 (1998) (arguing that "[t]he majority [in Virginia] did not raise the level of review
of gender classifications above the traditional intermediate level"); Ashley Elizabeth John-
son, Note, Single-Sex Classes in Public Secondary Schools: Maximizing the Value of a Public Educa-
tion for the Nation's Students, 57 VAND. L. REv. 629, 653-54 (2004) ("(T]he Court, in Virginia,
quotes the standard of intermediate scrutiny, and, despite using the term 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' throughout the opinion, defines that term only by reference to the
traditional intermediate scrutiny test.").
169 See David S. Cohen, Title I Beyond Equal Protection, 28 1-1Aay. J.L. & GENDER 217,
249 (2005) ("Even if the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia changed the
level of scrutiny applied to classifications based on sex, the decision nonetheless allows sex-
based classifications ...."); Morgan, supra note 94, at 383; Schottenfeld, supra note 166, at
674; Sunstein, supra note 167, at 75-76 (determining that the Court in Virginia did not
invalidate all single-sex educational programs); Williams, supra note 4, at 31 rile Consti-
tution also allows for sex segregation in education under limited circumstances.").
170 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for. the Celebration of 75 Years of Women's Enrollment at
Columbia Law Schoo4 102 CoLum. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2002).
171 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 554.
199 See id.
173 See infra notes 174-218 and accompanying text.
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1. Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary Education May Be
Constitutional Under Virginia
The Virginia standard left some wiggle room for single-sex public
elementary and secondary education to fit within constitutional
bounds. 174
 Indeed, in amending Title IX regulations, the DOE pur-
posely tracked the Supreme Court's language in Virginia175 and ac-
knowledged its holding.' 76
 In doing so, the DOE strove to protect what
it calls the "evenhanded provision of single-sex public educational op-
portunities, among a diversity of educational opportunities" from con-
stitutional challenge.'"
In general, single-sex education is substantially related to multi-
ple important governmental objectives approved in Viiginia." 8 First,
single-sex schools may be used to redress past economic harm done to
women and to promote equal employment opportunity. 179 Education
correlates with earnings,m and even today women's salaries lag be-
hind those of their male counterparts in the workplace; thus, our
largely coeducational system does not appear to be substantially clos-
ing the salary gap between the sexes. 181 Although perhaps not conclu-
sive, some studies do indicate that girls receive a better education in
single-sex environments. 182 In this way, single-sex schooling appears to
offer a viable option that may compensate for past discrimination,
which created the salary gap, and may boost the current economic
status of women by increasing their earning potential.' Also, other
studies indicate that single-sex education promotes the legitimate ob-
174 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524. See generally Johnson, supra note 168.
"8 71 Fed. Reg. 62,534 (Oct. 25, 2006) (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 ("We do not
question the State's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportuni-
ties.")).
178
	 id. ("[T) he Supreme Court has indicated that to justify a sex-based classification
the public entity must demonstrate that it is based on an important governmental objec-
tive and that exclusion of students of the other sex is substantially related to achievement
of that objective. The Supreme Court has ruled that the justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation' and that 'it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females.'" (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533)).
177 See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 56.
"8 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34.
179 See id. at 533.
ISO See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Earnings Gap Highlighted by Census Bureau
Data on Educational Attainment (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/releases/archives/education/009749.htla
191 See id.
182. See Single-Sex v. Coed: The Evidence, supra note 94.
188 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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jective of fully developing the talents and capacities of all because it
may also benefit boys. 184
In addition, the Court in Virginia left open the question of
whether providing diverse educational opportunities—such as those
provided by having both coeducational and single-sex programs—may
be a legitimate governmental objective tinder the Equal Protection
Clause. 185 Although the Court found the Commonwealth's alleged
policy of diversity to be unpersuasive in Virginia because history did
not support it, the Court was careful not to foreclose this line of ar-
gument altogether. 186 The Court stated: "We do not question the
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educa-
tional opportunities." 187 OCR specifically identifies diversity as one of
the important governmental objectives being served through allowing
the option of single-sex education. 188
Critics of single-sex education point to the definition of diversity
endorsed in 2003, in Gutter v. Bollinger, wherein the Supreme Court
referred to diversity within each classroom as a compelling govern-
mental objective. 189 These critics argue that it is this specific objective
to which the Court was referring in Virginia, and that single-sex edu-
cation actually controverts it. 190 But that argument is misplaced be-
cause the new Title IX regulations do not toll the end of coeducation;
rather, they allow for diversity of two types, both in the classroom in
coeducational schools, and also among schools by virtue of having
coeducational and single-sex schools. 191
' 84 See id., quoted in 71 Fed. Reg. 62,535 (Oct. 25, 2006); Single-Sex v. Coed: The Evi-
dence, supra note 94.
185 See generally Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
188 See id. at 539-40.
187 Id. at 534 n.7.
188 See 71 Fed. Reg. 62,534 ("[A] recipient can have an important governmental or
educational objective evenhandedly to provide the opportunity to choose among diverse
educational opportunities .... Although the Supreme Court has not decided the specific
issue of whether this objective is an important governmental or educational objective for
the purposes of justifying a sex-based classification under either Title IX or the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Court has suggested it would uphold the evenhanded provision of sin-
gle-sex educational opportunities." (citations omitted)).
189 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); see, e.g., Letter from Kim A. Gandy & Martha F. Davis, Nat'l
Org. for Women, to Kenneth L. Marcus, Assistant Sec'y for the Dep't of Educ. (Apr. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Letter from Gandy & Davis], available at http://www.now.org/issues/educa-
tion/042304comments.pdf; Letter from Murphy et al., supra note 18.
193 See Letter from Gandy & Davis, supra note 189; Letter from Murphy et al., supra
note 18.
' 91 See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2007); Sherwin, supra note 9, at 62-63.
.10
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Single-sex education singularly provides the means by which the
above objectives, approved in Virginia, can be carried out. 192 It is sub-
stantially related to those objectives because they cannot be carried
out in a purely coeducational system.'" Our current coeducational
system has not succeeded in eliminating the gender gap in our society
and generally does not offer diversity in the types of educational op-
portunities available, and the single-sex education Title IX regulations
permit has the potential to change this. 19" Moreover, OCR seeks to
ensure the constitutionality of its regulations by requiring funding
recipients to conduct at least biennial evaluations to confirm that any
single-sex classes or extracurricular activities are substantially related
to the achievement of the important objective for the classes or extra-
curricular activities."'"
2. Virginia Does Not Necessarily Preclude Single-Sex Public
Elementary and Secondary Education
Similarly, Virginia's constitutional bar against VMI's single-sex pol-
icy does not offer a cookie-cutter standard for all single-sex education.
For many reasons, the single-sex programs formed pursuant to Title IX
regulations can escape the pitfalls of sex classification deemed uncon-
stitutional under Virginia's standard. 196
The Court in Virginia proclaimed sex classifications unconstitu-
tional when they are based upon any generalization that tends to rein-
force the inferiority of one sex. 197 But, because parents may choose
whether to enroll their children at a single-sex school or not, single-
' 92 See 518 U.S. at 533-34; supra notes 178-188 and accompanying text. Thus, in accor-
dance with the Supreme Court's mandate, single-sex education is not the end of those
objectives. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545.
19' See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545-46; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731. In fact, for this reason, sin-
gle-sex education might even be able to meet the "narrowly tailored" requirement of strict
scrutiny. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
194 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7; United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411
(W.D. Va. 1991) ("The sole way to attain single-gender [in addition to coeducational) di-
versity is to maintain a policy of admitting only one gender to an institution."), vacated, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992); Single-Sex v. Coed: The Evidence, supra note 94.
I" 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) (4) (i).
'9° See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550; 34	 § 106.34.
191 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550 ("Generalizations about 'the way women are,' estimates
of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women
whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description."); see also Wengler,
446 U.S. at 152; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979); Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 206-
07; Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99; Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645; Frontier:), 411 U.S. at 684-85; Reed,
404 U.S. at 77; Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977).
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sex schools do not impose any badge of inferiority on their students.' 98
Indeed, courts have found that sex segregation in education "carries
no stigma of unworthiness to the excluded class." 199
In addition, the new regulations do not unconstitutionally rely on
"overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females" that Virginia chastised.m Single-sex
education is premised, at least in part, on the fundamental idea that
boys and girls learn in different ways. 201 It need not be premised on
the idea that boys are more talented at algebra than girls, or that girls
have a greater capacity to understand literature than boys. 202 This ra-
tionale further accords with Virginia's precedent, which repeatedly
recognized that "real differences" between the sexes may be taken
into consideration.203 Sex segregation is perfectly constitutional when
"'a Allison M. Otto, Single-Sex Education, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 353, 358 (2004); see 34
C.F.R. § 106.34; cf. Levit, supra note 5, at 518 (" t is difficult to believe that state sponsorship
of sex segregation can avoid imposing feelings of inferiority and superiority."); Rosemary
Salomone, Feminist Voices in the Debate over Single-Sex Schooling: Finding Common Ground, 11
Wulf. J. GENDER & L. 63, 73 (2004) (arguing that sex segregation "represents subordination
and inferiority, it perpetuates harmful stereotypes, and ... stigmatizes girls"); Vojdik, supra
note 97, at 94 (arguing that sex segregation "send [s] the message that the responsible adults
in society are unable (or unwilling) to prevent discrimination in our public schools").
Defending parents' control in their children's education is a goal of both the Court
and the legislature. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107410, § 5131(c),
115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codifying and amending Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925); Vorchheirter, 532 F.2d at 888. Providing single-sex schools, in addition to coedu-
cational ones, augments such control by allowing parents in the public school system—just
like those who can afford private school—to decide what type of education is best for their
children. See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 888; 71 Fed. Reg. 62,534-35 (Oct. 25, 2006).
199 Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 859 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); see Attorney
Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284, 291 (Mass. 1979).
200 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citing Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 643, 648); see also 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.34; cf. Williams, supra note 4, at 36 (arguing that "the proposed regulations very
likely will lead to the very gender-based stereotyping Title IX was enacted to combat");
ACLU, supra note 17 (quoting Emily J. Martin, Deputy Director of the ACLU Women's
Rights Project and disapproving of the "junk science stereotypes" on which the DOE relied
upon in developing the new regulations).
201 See Learning Style Differences, supra note 91.
202 see id.
203 Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981); Clark v. Ariz. Interscholas-
tic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982); Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at
1435 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434-37
(1998); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76-79 (1981); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508. Con-
curring in the Court's decision in Michael M. v. Supreior Court, Justice Stewart wrote:
[W]hile detrimental gender classifications by government often violate the
Constitution, they do not always do so, for the reason that there are differ-
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based upon those differences or upon generalizations that apply to all
wornen."4
Sex segregation only becomes unconstitutional when it is based
upon generalizations that represent a characteristic of the "average"
woman, not every woman. 205 OCR anticipated and eliminated this prob-
lem by specifying that single-sex programs may be established when
"some students under certain circumstances" might benefit from them,
thus eliminating the use of sex as a proxy for learning ability. 206 More-
over, the new Title IX regulations specifically stipulate that funding re-
cipients must conduct at least biennial evaluations to ensure that single-
sex opportunities are "based upon genuine justifications and do not
rely on overly broad generalizations about the different talents, capaci-
ties, or preferences of either sex essentially to ensure they remain con-
stitutional. "2°7
. In addition to lacking those characteristics deemed unconstitu-
tional in Virginia, single-sex programs formed pursuant to Title IX
regulations also differ from VMI in many ways that make them more
likely to prevail in a constitutional challenge. 208 The Court in Virginia
focused on the fact that VMI offered a unique opportunity to those
men hoping to become "citizen-soldiers" trained through an adversa-
ences between males and females that the Constitution necessarily recog-
nizes.
... [Uri certain narrow circumstances men and women are not similarly
situated; in these circumstances a gender classification based on clear differ-
ences between the sexes is not invidious, and a legislative classification realis-
tically based upon those differences is not unconstitutional.
In short, the Equal Protection Clause does not require that the physiologi-
cal differences between men and women must be disregarded.
450 U.S. at 478-81 (Stewart, J., concurring).
204 .See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 ("In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex
that is disproportionately burdened."); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 476 (upholding a statutory
rape law that applied differential treatment to men and women because only women have
the capacity to become pregnant).
205 See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550 ("Generalizations about 'the way women are,' es-
timates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description."); Wengler,
446 U.S. at 152; Caban, 441 U.S. at 394; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 206-07; Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-
99; Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645; Frontier°, 411 U.S. at 686-87; Reed, 404 U.S. at 77; Hoover,
430 F. Supp. at 169.
266 71 Fed. Reg. 62,532 (Oct. 25, 2006); Sherwin, supra note 9, at 58.
207 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) (4) (i)—(ii) (2007).
2" See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720; Johnson, supra note 168, at 675.
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tive method "of a kind not available anywhere else in [the state] ." 209 It
is unlikely that any public elementary or secondary school would offer
such a unique opportunity. Education in the public school system
tends to be relatively uniform across the board, particularly because
teachers must gear their lessons towards enabling their students to
pass national standardized tests. 210 Furthermore, the Court in Virginia
rejected VMI's categorical exclusion of all women "in total disregard
of their individual merit," despite the fact that some women could
meet its rigorous standards; 211 but such an individualized inquiry does
not matter in single-sex public elementary and secondary schools
where admission is not merit-based like it was at VMI. 212
Another constitutionally relevant difference is that, on the whole,
students in elementary and secondary schools are minors, whereas
those in postsecondary schools are not. 2" This matters because the
constitutional rights of students in elementary and secondary schools
are "not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults." 214 Although
209 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520.
210
	
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5131(c), 115 Stu.
1425 (2002) (codifying and amending Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)) (penalizing schools educating students
who consistently fail to do well enough on standardized tests); Land, supra note 97, at 320
("Most primary and secondary schools, however, will not have the problems WI did in
being unique. The general lack of 'intangible benefits' due to the generic nature of the
educational curriculum at primary and secondary schools suggests that most lower-level
single-sex schools will pass intermediate scrutiny." (citation omitted)).
2" Virginia, 518 U.S. at 546 (citation omitted).
012 See Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 350 (1998).
eta
	
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4
(2000) (declining to analogize cases dealing with public school students directly to those
involving university students because "[these] students and their schools' relations to them
are different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college edu-
cation"); Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 140 (1979) ("[S]ociety considers the modern
college student an adult, not a child of tender years. It could be argued that an educa-
tional institution possesses a different pattern of rights and responsibilities and retains
more of the traditional custodial responsibilities when its students are all minors, as in an
elementary school, or mostly minors, as in a high school.").
214 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (finding no First Amendment violation when a public
high school regulated the speech of one of its students); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Ac-
ton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (concluding that "unemancipated minors lack some of the
most fundamental rights of self-determination"); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350
n.2 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that "[t]he law recognizes a host of distinc-
tions between the rights and duties of children and those of adults"); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[O]ur cases show that although children generally are protected by
the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the
State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their
needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.'" (quoting McKeiver v. Penn-
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elementary and secondary school students are without a doubt entitled
to some protection under the Equal Protection Clause, they may not be
entitled to as great protection as the postsecondary students at VMI. 215
Single-sex education is thus less likely to infringe on the constitutional
rights of the elementary and secondary school students. 216 Moreover,
sex-based learning differences are more pronounced when students are
younger, so scientific research on those differences presents more per-
suasive justification in favor of single-sex education in elementary and
secondary settings than in undergraduate and postgraduate settings. 217
Therefore, programs formed pursuant to Title IX regulations may
more easily satisfy Virginia's standard. 218
C. Support from Title IX's Legislative and Post-Enactment History
Concerning Single-Sex Education
Although not conclusive on the constitutionality ,of Title IX's
regulations, the legislative and post-enactment history of the statute is
a significant point of reference in its interpretation. 219 It reveals Con-
gress's implied acceptance both of single-sex education at the elemen-
tary and secondary level and also of Title IX's new regulations gener-
ally, and thus it supports the regulations being upheld. 22°
Significantly, Title IX's framers neither categorically endorsed co-
education nor categorically proscribed single-sex education. 22' As an
initial matter, Congress clearly sought to provide equal access to educa-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 541, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion))); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 120 n.45 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("The state's
authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults.").
2 ' 5 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
216 See id.
217 See Hutchison, supra note 94, at 1080; Johnson, supra note 168, at 679.
218 See Hutchison, supm note 94, at 1080; Johnson, supra note 168, at 679.
219 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523-30 (1982). This is true despite
the paucity of congressional material to provide insight on what exactly the drafters in-
tended—no committee report or other congressional material recording the drafting of
Tide IX exists, and the floor debates on the statute were exceedingly brief, likely because
of all the legislative efforts and proceedings for the multiple failed attempts to pass similar
legislation prior to 1972. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 523 n.13, 527; Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993); Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact
Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute; 32 CONN. L. REV. 381, 410 (2000).
228 See infra notes 221-249 and accompanying text.
221 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 Sc Supp. III 2003); Rosemary Salomone, Rich Kids,
Poor Kids, and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 AKRON L. Rev. 209, 225 (2000).
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tional opportunities for all students, regardless of their sex. 222 This
overarching goal by no means necessarily requires coeducation. 223
The text of Title IX itself neither expressly prohibits nor permits
single-sex education in elementary or secondary schools, as it does in
other educational settings, because it explicitly does not cover admis-
sion to nonvocational elementary or secondary schools at al1. 224 This
certainly does not eliminate the possibility of having single-sex public
elementary and secondary education, and indeed, it supports that pos-
sibility. 225 Moreover, in no way does the statutory text provide a blanket
prohibition against single-sex education. 226 It does expressly prohibit
single-sex education in "institutions of vocational education, profes-
sional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institu-
tions of undergraduate higher education." 227 It expressly does not,
however, apply to certain sex-segregated activities such as fraternities
and sororities,228 the Boy and Girl Scouts,229 any Boys or Girls State or
Nation Conference,23° father-son or mother-daughter activities at an
educational institution, 231 or beauty pageants. 232 It also explicitly creates
an exception for public institutions of higher education that "tradition-
ally and continually" since their establishment have had a single-sex
admissions policy. 223 These textual exceptions allowing single-sex edu-
cation suggest that Title IX was not meant to bring about an era of ab-
222 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh);
117 CONG. REC. 30,155 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
223 See 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG. REC. 30,155
(1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
224 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1). Title IX expressly prohibits single-sex admissions poli-
cies in "institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher
education, and . . . public institutions of undergraduate higher education." Id. Some ar-
gue, therefore, that Title IX prohibits single-sex elementary and secondary education ac-
cording to the canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the ex-
pression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others). See Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F.
Supp. 1004, 1008-10 (E.D. Mich. 1991). This interpretation, however, ignores other modes
of interpretation. See infra notes 225-249 and accompanying text.
225 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1); 71 Fed. Reg. 62,540 (Oct. 25, 2006). But cf. Letter from
Murphy et al., supra note 18 (arguing that single-sex education is precluded by the pres-
ence of only narrow textual exceptions for permissible sex discrimination under Title IX).
226 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
227 	§ 1681 (a) (1) .
228 Id. § 1681(a) (6) (A) .
229 Id § 1681 (a) (6) (B).
25° Id. § 1681(a) (7) .
251 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (8).
232 Id. § 1681 (a) (9)
233 Id. § 1681 (a) (5) .
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solute coeducation but rather to end discrimination in existing educa-
tional institutions. 234
The actions of Title IX's framers further suggest their approval of
single-sex elementary and secondary education.233 In fact, in 1976, in
Vorchheimer v. School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that an all-male high school in Philadelphia passed mus-
ter under the Equal Protection Clause in part for this reason. 238 In
finding for the school district, the court quoted extensively from a
statement made by Senator Bayh during Title IX debates indicating
that he specifically intended to leave the option of single-sex educa-
tion available. 2" Also, the court noted that whereas an early draft of
Title IX passed by the House of Representatives contained an explicit
mandate for all single-sex schools to become coeducational, the Sen-
ate purposely eliminated it from the final version. 238 Thus, Title IX's
legislative history precludes the argument that the statute was abso-
lutely meant to foreclose the option of single-sex elementary and sec-
ondary education. 239 In this way, Title IX's legidative history supports
upholding the new regulations allowing for such education. 24°
254 See id. § 1681(a); Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military
Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 637,673–
74 (1993); supra notes 224-233 and accompanying text.
233 See Vorchheiiner, 532 F.2d at 883-85 ("Our research into the legislative history reveals
no indication of Congressional intent to order that every school in the land be coeduca-
tional and that educators be denied alternatives.").
23° See id. at 883,888. This is the only circuit court, and thus the highest court, to rule
on the issue of 'separate but equal" elementary and secondary education after the inven-
tion of intermediate scrutiny. See Fortney, supra note 86, at 865. The only other post-1976
case concerning this issue is Garrett v. Board of Education, decided in 1991 by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on a motion for a preliminary injunction,
and not on a determination of the merits after a trial. 775 F. Supp. at 1005. There, the
court'invalidated an all-boys school in Detroit because the state failed to demonstrate a
substantial relationship between the exclusion of girls from the school and its stated inter-
est in overcoming the problems boys faced, including high unemployment and school
drop-out rates. Id. at 1006-08.
237 See Vorchheinter, 532 F.2d at 883 ("'One result of the House approach is that all sin-
gle-sex elementary and secondary institutions of education—both public and private—
would be required to become coeducational. While this may be a desirable goal, no one
even knows how many single-sex schools exist on the elementary and secondary levels or
what special qualities of the schools might argue for a continued single sex status ....
After these questions have been properly addressed, then Congress can make a fully in-
formed decision on the question of which—if any—schools should be exempted.'" (quot-
ing 118 CONG. REC. 5804,5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) )).
238 See id.
232 See supra notes 219-238 and accompanying text.
240 See Williams, supra note 4, at 29 n.65; supra notes 219-238 and accompanying text.
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More generally, the fact that Title IX's drafters granted the statute
broad, sweeping language also makes its regulations less vulnerable to
attack. 241 The very broadness of the statute itself suggests that Congress
left HEW, and later OCR, to be the vehicle for providing specific guide-
lines for compliance with Title IX. 242 Although these agency regulations
are not strictly authoritative or binding, the Supreme Court has ex-
plained that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to ad-
minister."243 The administrative interpretation may only be struck down
when it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. "244
Thus, the administrative regulations that accompany Title IX enjoy
great deference.245
Title IX's new regulations deserve additional deference because of
Congress's tacit acquiescence to them.246 Congress could have expressed
its disapproval of the agencies' interpretations by vetoing the regula-
tions, but it did not exercise this power.247 Congress also has the ability
to veto the application of the Title IX regulations indirectly through its
ability to cut off funding under the statute, but it has not done this ei-
241 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555, 567 (1984) ("The contemporaneous legislative historic in short, provides no basis
for believing that Title IX's broad language is somehow inconsistent with Congress' under-
lying intent."); N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 521 ("There is no doubt that 'if we are to
give [Tide IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its
language.'" (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966))); Greene, supra note
167, at 164 (arguing that the Title IX regulations concerning athletics should be given
deference because congressional intent concerning athletics is unclear).
242 See Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle an Title IX
88 YALE U. 1254, 1261 (1979) [hereinafter Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics].
443 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc.' Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(citation omitted); ty: Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and
Intercollegiate Athletics: Title TX, Title VII, and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. J.
Seowrs & L. 177, 199 (1999) ("[T] he regulations promulgated by OCR under Title IX
have the force of statutory law."). See generally Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpreta-
tions Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990) (discussing the level of
deference agency regulations should be afforded).
244 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. But cf. Batterton v Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977)
("[A] court is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation. Varying degrees of
deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the
timing and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its expertise." (citation
omitted)).
245 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 522 n.12.
240 See Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 568; Harold H. Bruff, Congressional Control of Adminis-
trative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARK L. REV. 1369, 1431 (1977); Cohen,
supra note 169, at 246-47.
447 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)—(g) (2000).




 The Supreme Court has declared that these are additional rea-
sons that tend to support upholding regulations. 249
In. INFORMATIVE COMPARISONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE IX REGULATIONS CONCERNING
SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitu-
tionality of single-sex education promoted by the new Title IX regula-
tions, analogous precedent may shed some light on how the Court
would rule.25° Some critics of single-sex education argue by analogy to
the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, which struck down racial segregation in education. 2" They claim
that sex segregation in education similarly does not pass constitutional
muster. 252 This analogy, however, is imperfect in many ways, as described
below.255 Moreover, Brown has not had so pervasive an influence as to
extinguish the constitutionality of "separate but equal" altogether. 254
"Separate but equal" is a mechanism commonly used to maintain sex-
segregated athletic teams, which courts and even feminists tolerate. 255
Those who analyze the new Title IX regulations should recognize that
the Constitution's tolerance of sex segregation in athletics suggests its
corresponding tolerance of sex segregation in the classroom. 256
248 See Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 242, at 1262 n.58.
248 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 537-39; supra notes 219-248 and accompany-
ing text (concerning the utility of Tide IX's legislative history).
250 See infra notes 251-324 and accompanying text.
251 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
252 See Miaow, supra note 102, at 821; Sherwin, supra note 9, at 67; ACLU, supra note
17; NOW supra note 17.
252 See infra notes 257-281 and accompanying text.
254 See 347 U.S. at 495; Robinson, supra note 212, at 324; Sangree, supra note 219, at
432. This has occurred despite the fact that language of Title IX itself contains nothing
related to athletics, and even the congressional debates prior to its enactment gave only
passing reference to them. Sangree, supra note 219, at 387; see Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991
F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that 'there were apparently only two mentions of
intercollegiate athletics during the congressional debate" (citing 118 CONG. REC. 5807
(1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)); 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(noting that Title IX will not require gender-blended football teams). Furthermore, the
contact sports exemption arose not from the originally proposed regulations, but rather
from the comments in response to those regulations. See Sangree, supra note 219, at 387.
255 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1427; Robinson, supra note 212, at
323.
258 See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 243, at 194.
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A. "Separate' but Equal" in the Gender Context Should Not Meet the Same
Fate as in the Race Context
In Brown, the Supreme Court held the doctrine of "separate but
equal" to be unconstitutional in so far as it enabled discrimination on
the basis of race in public education. 257 There, the Court struck down
state laws permitting or requiring segregation of children in public
elementary and secondary schools by race because the laws violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.256 Chief Jus-
tice Warren, writing for the unanimous Court, famously held, Tin the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 259 The
Chief Justice cited the paramount importance of education in Ameri-
can society,26° and he explained that racial segregation creates a detri-
mental and permanent stigma of inferiority for black children that
greatly detracts from their educational development. 261 Over the past
fifty-two years, this case has been cited by courts over 2000 times—its
tremendous impact on the construction of equality in the United States
cannot be . understated. 262 It remains to be seen, however, whether this
case will be extended to apply in the gender context. 263
There are many reasons why the prohibition on "separate but
equal" in the race context is not immediately transferable to the gen-
der context. 264 Important differences exist between race and sex such
237 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The Supreme Court originally propounded this doctrine
in Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana statute providing
for "separate but equal" accommodations for white and black passengers).
253 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
259 Id.
260 See id, at 493.
261 See id. at 494.
262 A November 2007 Shepard's search on Brown revealed over 2000 case citations.
262 See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 65; Sirnson, supra note 102, at 443; Vojdik, supra note
97, at 319; Gurney, supra note 168, at 1218 n.281.
264 See Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate but Equal or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy
Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1103
(1996) (finding that although "separate but equal" is prohibited in the race context, it still
"retains vitality when it comes to sexual segregation"); Robinson, supra note 212, at 336-37;
Schottenfeld, supra note 166, at 674 ("It would be inaccurate to make a direct association
between the separation of races and the separation of sexes."). Moreover, analogizing sex to
race does not always lead to the conclusion that sex segregation has no place in the class-
room. See Minow, supra note 102, at 821. For example, in joining the majority in Missouri v.
Jenkins, in 1995, Justice Thomas reasoned that presuming black students will suffer psycho-
logical harm by being segregated means presuming their inferiority. 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, Professor Martha Minow argues, "By analogy, to assume that
an all-girls school harms girls is to assume that girls are inferior and cannot receive the same
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that legal analysis involving the two cannot be completely congru-
ent.265 Such differences, in fact, contributed to the drafting of Title IX
not as an amendment to Title VI, the race discrimination statute, but
rather, as a separate entity. 266 The Nixon administration opposed such
an amendment to Title VI on the ground that gender, unlike race,
could in some situations provide a legally-sound basis for differential
treatment. 267 Indeed, for this reason, although the language of Title
IX tracks that of Title VI closely, it contains numerous exceptions not
found in Title VI allowing for some differential treattnent. 2"
Although race and sex are both immutable characteristics that may
be used to impose a stigma of inferiority, they are different in two im-
portant ways.269 First, the history of race discrimination is tied up in ha-
tred of the minority because of skin color, unlike that of sex discrimina-
tion, which is tied up in the desire to protect the minority because of
alleged fragility. 27° In the race context, separation enables hatred to
thrive because lack of contact between the races prevents the growth of
mutual understanding and respecon In the gender context, separa-
tion enables those of the protected sex—usually women—to emerge
from their sheltered bubble and find greater opportunity to excel and
close the gender gap. 272 For this reason, though racial equality requires
integration, gender equality does not. 273
Second, unlike people of different races, people of different
sexes are distinct because of physiological and psychological differ-
ences.274 Such differences are already used to justify the separation of
level of educational challenge alone together that they would in a coeducational setting."
Minow, supra note 102, at 821.
266 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1458.
266 See Sangree, supra note 219, at 411.
267
 See id.
268 Allison Herren Lee, Title IX Equal Protection, and the Richter Scale: Will VMI's Vibra-
tions Topple Single-Sex Education, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37, 68 (1997); see supra notes 226—
233.
269 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1458; infra notes 270-277 and accom-
panying text.
2" Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1459; Levit, supra note 5, at 518.
271 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1459.
272 See id.
273 Id. ("Thus, to achieve racial equality the races must mix; to achieve gender equality
in school sports separation seems most desirable.").
274 See id. at 1458; Schottenfeld, supra note 166, at 674; Letter from Leonard Sax, supra
note 16 ("You can't tell by looking at a child's brain whether that child is Black or White,
Asian or Hispanic. But you can tell, by looking at a child's brain, whether the child is a girl
or a boy.").
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students by age throughout education. 275 In 1996, in United States v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court itself stated that although people of dif-
ferent races have no "'inherent'" differences, this is not the case for
people of different sexes. 276 Inherent sex differences thus provide a
rationale for "separate but equal" in the gender context. 277
Moreover, the courts have unwaveringly recognized that race and
sex deserve to be treated differently, as demonstrated by the mere fact
that the two receive different degrees of judicial scrutiny—race, which
has been designated a suspect classification, receives strict scrutiny;
whereas gender, which has been designated a semi-suspect classification,
receives a lesser degree of scrutiny. 278 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Virginia explicitly recognized that race classifications differ from gender
classifications in this regard. 279 In addition, Virginia—the most recent
Supreme Court case addressing single-sex education—tellingly ne-
glected to reference Brown even once in its opinion. 280 Thus, the Su-
275 Letter from Leonard Sax, supra note 16 ( -Most school districts routinely assign 6-
year-olds and 16-year-olds to different schools. We understand that the differences in how
6-year-olds and 16-year-olds learn are so substantial that it doesn't make sense to try to
educate them together.").
278 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)).
277 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) ("M] etrimental racial
classifications by government always violate the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so
far as the Constitution is concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated
.... But we have recognized that in certain narrow circumstances men and women are not
similarly situated."); Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 886 (1976), affd, 430 U.S. 703
(1977) ("We are committed to the concept that there is no fundamental difference be-
tween races and therefore, in justice, there can be no dissimilar treatment. But there are
differences between the sexes which may, in limited circumstances, justify disparity in the
law."); Ritacco V. Norwin Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930, 932 (W.D. Penn. 1973).
278 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 886; see also Richard Alan Rubin, Comment, Sex Discrimi-
nation in Interscholastic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. Rev. 535, 557 (1974). In fact,
Congress implicitly rejected the imposition of strict scrutiny on sex-based classifications
when it failed to ratify a proposed amendment to the Constitution, the Equal Rights
Amendment, which would have prohibited the federal government and the states from
denying or abridging equality of rights on account of sex. See Hunt, supra note 62, at 58
n.26. For more discussion on the different levels of judicial scrutiny, see supra note 120.
279 518 U.S. at 532 ("Without equating gender classifications, for all purposes, io classi-
fications based on race or national origin, the Court ... has carefully inspected official
action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women {or to men).") (emphasis
added).
289 See Robinson, supra note 212, at 338 ("Brown is not mentioned in [Virginia) and it is
quite possible that the lack of reference is intentional."); Schottenfeld, supra note 166, at
674 ("[The Virginia] opinion made no mention of Brown, a tactic most likely used to avoid
a complete indoctrination of the separate but equal notion as it currently applies to gen-
der."); Sherwin, supra note 9, at 50 ("[The Court in Virginia] does not view the absolute
prohibition of racial segregation articulated in Brown and its progeny as controlling on
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preme Court seems to be channeling its sex-segregation jurisprudence
down a path different from that of its race-segregation jurisprudence. 28I
B. A Better Analogy: How the Constitutionality of Sex Segregation in
Athletics Informs Our Understanding of the Constitutionality
of Sex Segregation in Classrooms
1. Title IX and Athletics: Leaving Room for Single-Sex Opportunities
Rather than following Brown, sex segregation in education, such
as that permissible under the new Title IX regulations, should instead
follow precedent involving sex segregation in athletics. 282 The "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine has flown beneath the radar and continued
to thrive in the realm of athletics, where Title IX is perhaps best
known for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. 283 Although
this practice of sex-segregated athletic teams has not received explicit
approval from the Supreme Court, which has denied certiorari on the
subject, many of the lower courts have regularly thrown their weight
in favor of upholding its constitutionality. 284 In fact, every appellate
court that has considered the constitutionality of Title IX's athletic
equality regulation—which provides for segregation on the basis of
sex—has upheld 11. 285 Moreover, many of the courts that have en-
joined unisex teams when no team exists for the excluded sex have
questions of sex segregation. Indeed, the Court did not even cite Brown."). But see Pinzler,
supra note 15, at 795-96 (arguing that the Court in Virginia does not cite to Brown simply
because the issues in Brown, "separate but equal" educational opportunities in elementary
and secondary education, were not at issue in Virginia).
281 See Robinson, supra note 212, at 338.
282 See infra notes 283-324 and accompanying text.
283 See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 243, at 178 ("In athletics, there is no 'sex
blind' counterpart to 'colorblind' justice."); Sangree, supra note 219, at 432.
494 See Schottenfeld, supra note 166, at 680; see, e.g., O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch.
Dist. No. 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1980) (holding that a girl may be excluded from trying
out for the boys' basketball team when there was an girls' equivalent); Yellow Springs Ex-
empted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 657
(6th Cir. 1981); Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170 (D. Colo. 1977); Ritacco, 361 F.
Supp. at 932; Bucha v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
286 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2007); Cohen, supra note 169, at 251 (citing Nat'l Wrestling
Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dept of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94-95 (D.D.C. 2003) (listing eight
circuit courts that have approved of Title IX's requirements in challenges to the constitu-
tionality or statutory authority of the regulations), affil 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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clarified that the Equal Protection Clause violation could be corrected
by the addition of, in their words, a "separate but equal" team.286
Title IX regulations do generally provide that no athletics may be
segregated on the basis of sex, but this overarching provision is quali-
fied in two substantial ways that essentially negate it. 287 First, sex-
segregated athletic teams may be maintained when they are selected
based upon competitive skill and offered to both sexes. 288 By and large,
this exception applies to almost all athletic teams, which are generally
selected based upon competitive skill. 289 The regulation mandates sex
integration for these competitive teams only when a team is offered to
members of one sex but not the other and when the athletic opportuni-
ties of the members of the excluded sex have previously been lim-
ited. 29°
Second, the regulation sanctions sex-segregated athletic teams
unconditionally for all contact sports such as boxing, wrestling, rugby,
ice hockey, football, and basketball. 291 OCR has further clarified this
to mean that under Title IX an institution may maintain an all-male
256 Croudace & Desniirais, supra note 163, at 1426 (citing cases); see Comes v. R.I. In-
terscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 666 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st
Cir. 1979); Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 170.
It is thus "the most authoritative statement to date that so long as females are provided
with an all-female equivalent team, courts will not require defendants to allow females to
try out for the all-male contact sports team to satisfy the guarantee of Equal Protection."
Sangree, supra note 219, at 434; see O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1301; Yellow Springs, 647 F.2d at
657-58; Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (6th Cir. 1976);
Ritacco, 361 F. Supp. at 932; Bucha, 351 F. Supp. at 75.
The contact sports exemption tends to run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause when
there exists only one single-sex team and no "equal" option for the excluded sex. See
Greene, supra note 167, at 145. This Note examines only the issues that arise when the
requirements of "separate but equal" have been met.
2457 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) ("No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramu-
ral athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics sepa-
rately on such basis."); id. § 106.41(b) (providing exceptions to 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)); Sex
Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 242, at 1259 ("Separate teams are for-
bidden under the general prohibition of sex discrimination but are permitted under its
exceptions?).
285 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
289 See Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind This IX,
34 U. MICH, J.L. REFORM 13, 47 n.154 (2001); Greene, supra note 167, at 142; Sex Discrimi-
nation and Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 242, at 1258 n.34 ("By virtue of this competitive-
skill exception, all intercollegiate sports were exempted from the prohibition of separate
teams."). The regulations themselves recognize the prevalence of single-sex sports. See 34
C.F.R. § 106.41 (b).
29° 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
291 See id.
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contact sports team that need never be open to women, and it must
only offer a separate all-female team when there is the interest and
ability to support such a team. 292
The wide reach of the contact sports exemption has drawn much
attention . 2" The regulation itself offers no self-justification, thus those
seeking to invoke its protection have had to coin their own reason-
ing.294 Courts have recognized a few governmental objectives, dis-
cussed below, that are important enough to satisfy the requirements .
of the Equal Protection Clause. 295
The most accepted governmental objective is to maintain, foster,
and promote athletic opportunities for girls. 296 In large part, this is
292 See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (June 4, 1975) (statement of Caspar Weinberger, Secretary
of HEW); A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg.
71,417-18 (Dec. 11, 1979); see also Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.Sd 643, 647-48 (4th Cir.
1999) (holding that a university does not have to allow members of the excluded sex to try
out for a single-sex contact-sport team, but once it does allow such members to try out for
the team it may no longer discriminate on the basis of sex); Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp.
663, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that Title IX neither requires nor prohibits coed compe-
tition in contact sports); Force v. Pierce City R-V1 Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1025 (W.D.
Mo. 1983) (finding that Tide IX "simply takes a neutral stand" on whether a school may
prohibit a girl from trying out for the all-boys football team).
293 See Greene, supra note 167, at 134-35.
2" See id. at 146.
293 See infra notes 296-305. Not all courts, however, have held these objectives to be
important enough to withstand intermediate scrutiny. See Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169-71;
Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396, 1399-1400 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d
882, 891-93 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
296 See Petrie v. III. High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862 (III. App. Ct. 1979). But this need
may be receding as more and more girls are participating in sports as compared with boys.
Adam S. Darowski, For Kenny, Who Wanted to Play Women's Field Hockey, 12 Dube J. GENDER L. &
POLY 153, 156-57 (2005) (citing Me. Human Rights Comm'n v. Me. Principals Ass'n, No.
CV-97-599, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 23, at *14-15 (Me. Super., Jan. 21, 1999)).
Safety is another governmental objective that has been considered, but many courts
have rejected it as illegitimate and unrelated to sex segregation. See e.g., Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) ("Ulf the statutory objective is to exclude or
`protect' members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent
handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate."); Fortin v. Darling-
ton Little League, 514 F.2d 344, 349-51 (1st Cir. 1975) (rejecting safety as the rationale
behind denying girls the right to participate in a little league baseball program); Adams V.
Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding that safety is an important govern-
mental objective but that prohibiting girls from wrestling is '`overly 'paternalistic*" and not
substantially related to that objective); Saint v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 626,
629 (D. Neb. 1988); Force, 570 F. Supp. at 128 (finding that safety is an important govern-
mental objective but that "Where is no evidence, or even any suggestion, that [the female
plaintiff] herself could not safely participate in [the] football program [at issue]"); Hoover,
430 F. Supp. at 169 (declining to allow an athletic association to exclude a qualified girl •
from a boys' soccer team simply out of fear of her becoming injured); Mass. Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 296.
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justified by inherent differences between girls and boys. 297 Some peo-
ple argue that physiological differences generally make boys bigger,
stronger, and faster than similar-age girls such that boys are physically
more athletic.298 As a result, on fields of integrated teams, boys con-
trol the game more than girls do.299 Moreover, boys take roster spots,
starting positions, and playing time from girls. 3" If boys and girls were
to compete for spots on the same team based on skill and ability,
many more boys would be selected, and thus many girls would lose
the opportunity to play and/or would be discouraged from playing
sports altogether."' To prevent such male domination and to ensure
that girls have an equal opportunity to play—one that is "meaningful,
rather than token"—separate teams are required. 302
Moreover, a showing of male dominance in a coed athletic arena
is detrimental because it may actually reinforce the stereotype that
women are less athletically gifted. 393 Giving girls a separate arena in
which to demonstrate their abilities will promulgate their athletic
prowess, providing a haven in which they can flex their muscles out
 See Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1982); Cape, 563
F.2d at 795 (holding that separate girls' and boys' basketball teams further the important
government objective of providing equal athletic opportunity based on '`the distinct differ-
ences in physical characteristics and capabilities between sexes"); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscho-
lastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 953 (D.R.I. 1991) ("Because of innate physiological
differences, boys and girls are not similarly situated as they enter athletic competition.
Some classification based on gender may therefore be justified."), vacated by 612 A.2d 734,
738 (RI. 1992); Comes, 469 F. Supp. at 662 ("At the high school level, the average male is
objectively more physically capable than the average female.").
298 See Comes, 469 F. Supp. at 662; Buda, 351 F. Supp. at 75 n.3 (relying on testimony
that men are taller, have greater muscle mass, larger hearts, deeper breathing capacity, and
can run faster as compared with women (citing Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 342 F.
Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972))); Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862; see also Darowski, supra note 296,
at 156-57 (citing Me. Human Rights Comm'n, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS, at *14-15); Sangree,
supra note 219, at 419; Karen Tokarz, Separate but Unequal Sports Thvgrants: The Need for a New
Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 218 (1985).
299 See Darowski, supra note 296, at 157.
50° See id.; see also B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
1987) (quoting Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131).
"I See O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1307 ("[T]here would be a substantial risk that boys would
dominate the girls' programs and deny them an equal opportunity to compete."); Cape,
563 F.2d at 795; Pone, 570 F. Supp. at 1025-28; Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 170; Carnes v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); B.C., 531 A.2d at
1065.
302 Brake, supra note 289, at 135-36 (citing cases); see Croudace & Desmarais, supra
note 163, at 1461; Rubin, supra note 278, at 551. Indeed, for this reason, "Separate teams
may to a large extent aid in . . . equalization." Yellow Springs, 647 F.2d at 657.
283 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1449.
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side of the intimidating shadow of boys. 304 Thus, "separate but equal"
allows girls to better attain their full athletic potential. 305
2. Title IX and Athletics: Making a Case for Single-Sex Education
Physical differences ,that have been found to justify "separate but
equal" on the athletic field provide an equally potent argument for
"separate but equal" in the classroom. 306 Although research may con-
flict over the merits of single-sex education, it generally does not refute
the fact that there are physical differences between the minds of girls
and boys, just as there are physical differences between the bodies of
girls and boys. 507 On this account, "separate but equal" in the classroom
may find some support from an analogy to athletics.508 As the Supreme
Court has already recognized, "Sometimes the grossest discrimination
can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly
alike. "309
Like the debate concerning the value of single-sex education,
there exists a debate among scholars concerning the value of single-sex
teams. 310 Some claim that coed competition may actually be more ad-
vantageous than single-sex competition. 311 Likewise, such people view
sex segregation in athletics as harmful to women by reinforcing a
S414 See Brake, supra note 289, at 137; Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1460;
Polly S. Woods, Boys Muscling in on Girls' Sports, 53 Onto ST. U. 891, 897 (1992) (arguing
that girls may be able to develop their own sports prowess, via all-girl teams, which may
not be possible through a coeducational-team system").
"I' See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text.
Gy. Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1458 (arguing that physical differ-
ences between the sexes prevent them from competing equally in sports, whereas no such
impediment prevents equal competition in academics).
3° 7 See Brain Differences, supra note 86; supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
ma See Brain Differences, supra note 86; supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
SeeJenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 492 (1971) (upholding a law providing that any
political organization whose candidate received twenty percent or more of the vote at the
most recent gubernatorial or presidential election is a "political party"); see also Yellow
Springs, 647 F.2d at 657-58 (upholding a regulation prohibiting all contact-sports teams
from being coed and noting that -males and females are not in fact similarly situated and
when the law is blind to those differences, there may be as much a denial of equality as
when a difference is created which does not exist"); Fortney, supra note 86, at 880 ("If sci-
entific research shows differences [in male and female brains], no discrimination would be
based on 'archaic and stereotypic notions.' Thus, any educationally-based gender segrega-
tion would be permissible, whether that be in the third-grade or law school.").
3 ' 0 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1446; Jessica E. Jay, Women's Participation
in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 21 (1997) (citing jack H. Wilmore,
Exploding the Myth of Female Inferiority, 2 PilYSICIAN AND SPORTSMED. 54, 55 (1981)).
3" See Brenden, 477 F.2d at 1300-01.
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stigma of inferiority. 312 Others argue that physical differences affecting
athletic performance between girls and boys may be sociologically,
rather than biologically, induced due to the historical restrictions im-
posed on girls. 313 One court has noted that differences among individ-
ual athletes are greater than those between the sexes. 314 Other courts
claim that sex-segregated teams are based merely on age-old stereotypes
and doused in "romantic paternalism." 315 Indeed, critics of the contact
sports exemption claim that sex segregation in athletics is the product
of a lingering conception of sports as an exclusive all-boys club. 316
Despite all of those arguments, however, the constitutionality of
"separate but equal" in athletics has generally been upheld. 317 Very
similar arguments have been made to strike down the new Title IX
regulations regarding single-sex education, but the constitutionality of
these regulations should, by analogy, not necessarily be placed in
jeopardy. 318
Furthermore, the acquiescence to the doctrine of "separate but
equal" in the athletic arena suggests its general acceptability. 319 An
investigation of Title IX and athletics reveals further proof that the
framers of Title IX themselves did not envision a uniformly coeduca-
312 See Brake, supra note 289, at 144; Greene, supra note 167, at 163; Tokarz, supra note
298, at 232-33.
313 See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 163, at 1446; Jay, S1117111 note 310, at 21 (citing
Wilmore, supra note 310, at 55).
314 See Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169.
313 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1972) ("Traditionally, such discrimina-
tion was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."); Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at
290 ("[D]isadvantages suffered by males are often premised on a 'romantic paternalism'
stigmatizing to women." (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684)); see Lantz, 620 F. Supp. at 665-
66 (enjoining the enforcement of a regulation that prohibits coed competition in basket.
ball, boxing, football, ice hockey, rugby, and wrestling because it was based on "averages
and generalities" concerning the relative strength and speed of boys and girls in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause); Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1029; Croudace & Desmarais, supra
note 163, at 1442. But see Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862 (explaining that sex segregation of
sports teams is "not based on generalizations that are 'archaic,' nor does it represent an
attitude of 'romantic paternalism'") (citations omitted).
316 See Sangree, supra note 219, at 409.
s” See O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1301; Kelly v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994);
Yellow Springs, 647 F.2d at 656; see also Brake, supra note 289, at 134 ("Much of Title IX law
. • . proceeds from the presumed validity of sex-segregation as an organizing principle for
competitive athletic programs.").
319 See Kelly, 35 F.3d at 270; Yellow Springs, 647 F.2d at 656; O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of
Sch. Dist. 23, 545 F. Supp. 376, 383 (N.D. I11.1982), affd, 449 U.S. 1301 (1980).
3 / 9 See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 243, at 194.
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tional world.32° When promoting an unsuccessful earlier version of
Title IX, Senator Bayh clearly stated:
I do not read [the predecessor bill of Title IX] as requiring
integration of dormitories between the sexes, nor do I feel it
mandates the desegregation of football fields. What we are
trying to do is provide equal access for women and men stu-
dents to the educational process and the extracurricular ac-
tivities in a school, where there is not a unique facet such as
football involved. We are not requiring that intercollegiate
football be desegregated, nor that the men's locker room be
desegregated."'
Thus, Senator Bayh was concerned with facilitating the full entrance
of women to education and related activities, on a level equal to that
of men; he was not advocating for the full integration of women with
men in educational settings. 322
Title IX has been most lauded for achieving gender equality in
sports, and it did so largely through a "separate but equal" system
generally considered constitutional. 323 The new Title IX regulations
open the door for gender equality to be achieved in the same way in
public elementary and secondary education, and they should likewise
be upheld as constitutional. 324
CONCLUSION
Title IX has long been associated with the ascension of gender .
equality in the United States. The DOE has continued in this great leg-
acy by promulgating new Title IX regulations that specifically allow for
single-sex education in public elementary and secondary schools. In
light of research suggesting the advantages offered by single-sex educa-
tional environments, the new regulations embrace the opportunity to
520 See Yellow  Springs, 647 F.2d at 657 (In Title IX, Congress struck a balance between the
needs of the individual athlete and the group and determined that for purposes of the stat-
ute equality is to be measured by the opportunities offered to the group, not by the makeup
of any individual team.") (citation omitted); 1I7 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of
Sen. Bayh).
321 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
322 See id.
323 See Cheryl L. Schubert-Madsen et al., Gender Discrimination in Athletics, 67.N.D. L.
Rev. 227, 234 (1991); supra notes 282-305.
324 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2007).
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help eradicate the stubborn vestiges of gender discrimination in this
country.
These Title IX regulations should be upheld, despite legal chal-
lenges likely to arise from speculative fears that they will only exacer-
bate discrimination on the basis of sex. Administrative regulations tra-
ditionally receive tremendous deference, and neither the legislative
and post-enactment history of Title IX nor the pertinent Supreme
Court decisions pose a bar to public elementary and secondary single-
sex education. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled directly
on the constitutionality of such education, the regulations permitting it
would likely pass intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause Of the Fourteenth Amendment. Providing single-sex education
is substantially related to achieving important governmental objectives,
such as redressing past economic harm to women, developing fully the
talents and capacities of our entire population, and providing diversity
in the types of educational opportunities available today.
Because it relies on inherent physiological and psychological dif-
ferences between the sexes, single-sex education should not fall victim
to the doctrine prohibiting "separate but equal" educational oppor-
tunities in the context of race. There are no such inherent differences
between races, and consequently, race receives a greater degree of ju-
dicial scrutiny than does gender.
Single-sex education should follow in the footsteps of the doctrine
permitting "separate but equal" athletic teams segregated by sex. This
doctrine has been met with near universal acceptance in society and in
the courts. Just as we have used sex segregation to advance women's
status in the realm of sports, we should also use it to advance women's
status in the realm of education. Indeed, Title IX is best known for its
success in leveling the playing field for athletics, which was accom-
plished largely through sex segregation; Tide IX and its new regula-
tions have just as much potential to do the same for education.
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